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EFFICIENT DEFINITION AND COMMUNICATION
OF PATENT RIGHTS: THE IMPORTANCE OF EX
POST DELINEATION
William R. Hubbard t
Abstract
As with any area of law, rights and duties relating to patents
should be clearly communicated in an efficient manner.
Unfortunately, uncertainty concerning the scope of the rights granted
by patents frequently results in expensive litigation. Most proposals
for reducing this uncertainty do not examine its root causes and focus
only on measures to provide additional clarification in patent
applications. Such ex ante proposals are often inefficient because
considerable uncertainty is inherent, given the limits of language and
of our ability to foresee future developments. In addition, ex ante
clarification often would be wasteful because so few patents are
valuable enough to be contested. Therefore, ex post clarification of
patent scope after potentially infringing activities have occurred
would be more efficient than efforts to clarify exclusively through ex
ante measures. More specifically, two ex post techniques should be
adopted. First, courts should recognize that patents often cannot
communicate ex ante the scope of patent rights and should adjust
certain patent law doctrines accordingly. Second, an administrative
procedure should be established to cheaply clarify patent scope after
a patent has issued.
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING THE SCOPE OF
PATENTS

In many respects, patents comport with traditional notions of
property.l Patents can be owned, bought, sold, and licensed. Patents
can also be incredibly valuable assets, as shown by high-profile patent
t William Hubbard is an attorney in the intellectual property litigation group at Alston
& Bird LLP in Atlanta, Georgia. The views expressed in this article are my own, and not those
of Alston & Bird or its clients. I thank Henry Smith of Yale Law School and Pat Flinn of Alston
& Bird for their insightful comments and suggestions.
I. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("It is beyond
reasonable debate that patents are property.").
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litigation like the dispute between NTP and Research In Motion
(RIM) regarding RIM's Blackberry email service, which resulted in a
612.5 million dollar settlement following a finding of patent
infringement. 2 Such settlements (and similar judgments) occur
because patents confer rights to exclude people from undertaking
commercial activities that may be lucrative. 3 This feature of patents
further justifies an understanding of patents as a form of "property,"
as the right to exclude has been termed "the very definition of
'property. ",4 Unfortunately, this similarity has important limits. With
physical property, it is relatively straightforward to determine the
"thing" that is possessed and owned,5 and this ease of determination
facilitates the identification of the factual scenarios in which the right
of exclusive possession applies. 6 For example, to determine whether
someone has trespassed on a parcel of land, an owner need only
discover whether that person crossed a boundary of the property,
which typically is a simple process. 7 With patents, however, it is often
hard to determine the thing" that is owned and thus hard to identify
the "boundaries" delimiting the contexts in which the right to exclude
applies. As a result, determining the scope of a patent is a critical step
in any negotiation for the license or sale of patent rights or in any
patent lawsuit. 8 Indeed, many patent infringement cases settle after

2. Ian Austen, BlackBerry Service to Continue, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at Cl.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000) ("[W]hoever ... makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention ... infringes the patent."). Injunctive relief, however, is not automatically
awarded for patent infringement. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, Inc., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
4. Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983); e.g.,
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) ("The power to
exclude has traditionally been considered one of the treasured strands in an owner's bundle of
property rights.")
5. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73,
83 (1985) (discussing the difficulty of "possessing" patentable ideas).
6. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. &
Econ. 265, 276 (1977) ("Unlike fisheries, public roads, and other types of goods usually
considered, technological information can be used without signaling that fact to another.").
7. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE LJ. 1315, 1327-28 (1993)
(describing the reduction in monitoring costs produced by clear boundaries); William R.
Hubbard, Note, Communicating Entitlements: Property and the Internet, 22 YALE L. & POL'y
REV. 401, 404-05 (2004).
8. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, M'D LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46 (2008); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The
Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1025 (2007); Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction,
38 RUTGERS LJ. 61, 68 (2006) (describing claim construction as "the most important step in
any patent litigation").
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the court determines the scope of the patent, even if infringement
itself has not yet been decided. 9
Because determining the scope of a patent before resorting to
litigation is not only important but also fraught with potential
uncertainty, it is tempting to try to reduce uncertainty by using
analogies to concepts applicable to traditional property. However,
when determining boundaries, the analogies between patents and
traditional notions of property rights become less useful and
potentially misleading. Lacking the tangible corpus of traditional
property, the scope of a patent is largely determined by reference to
the written patent document, particularly the patent's "claims," which
are numbered sentences at the end of the patent (and the patent
application before the patent issues) that "particularly point[] out and
distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention."JO While interpreting these claims to determine the scope
of patent protection, courts often liken them to the "metes and
bounds" of a parcel of land. II Construing the claims may be
straightforward in instances where the patent claims, when
understood through accepted rules of interpretation, clearly
communicate that a set of facts is covered by the patent. 12 Often,
however, patent claims are open to conflicting interpretations, each of
which is reasonable. 13 In such cases, the "metes and bounds" analogy
is a legal fiction that is, at best, unhelpful and, at worst, misleading.
Because of the importance of determining the scope of patents,
courts and commentators consider scope uncertainty to be a serious

9. See Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim
Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333,337 & n.21 (2007); Osenga, supra note 8, at 69; Christopher
A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47
WM. & MARY L. REv. 49, 70-71 & n.99 (2005).

10.
II.

12.

35 U.S.c. § 112 (2000); see infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
See infra note 149.
See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text; cf H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF

LAW 130 (2d ed. 1994) ("Legal theory has in this matter a curious history; for it is apt either to
ignore or to exaggerate the indeterminacies oflegal rules.").
13. Osenga, supra note 8, at 64; see also Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and

Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction
Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175,205-08 (2001) (discussing the unpredictability of claim
construction). In fact, the extent to which the Patent Office requires adjustment to the text of
patent claims during the application process heavily depends upon which patent examiner is
working on the patent, indicating that different patent examiners interpret patent claims
differently. See Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
lSI, ISS, 170(2004).
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problem that must be remedied through legal reform. I4 Many argue
that patent applications should be required to contain additional
information regarding the claimed inventions. IS This article argues
that these proposed enhancements before a patent issues are
misguided. Certainly, some patents can be improved. Patentees may
sometimes be strategically unclear or just sloppy. But a certain
amount of uncertainty is often unavoidable, or even desirable, for at
least three reasons. I6 First, uncertainty regarding patent scope often
stems from the indeterminacy inherent in any effort to describe, with
words, the full scope the patentee's inventive contribution. Even if the
patentee were to include additional information regarding the
invention, substantial uncertainty would persist. Second, for a variety
of good reasons, patents must be broadened beyond the specific
details of the discovery of the inventions covered by the patents.
Implicit broadening is inherently unclear, and even explicit
broadening engenders uncertainty because broad claim terms are
likely to be indeterminate. Third, even if some uncertainty could be
removed by requiring patent applicants to provide more robust
information regarding patent scope, it is often inefficient to do so. As
the Supreme Court stated long ago, "[t]he specification and claims of
a patent, particularly if the invention be at all complicated, constitute
one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with
accuracy .... ,,17 Drafting patents is hard, and the benefits from many
proposed additional requirements likely do not justify the costs
involved.
Part II of this article describes, in general terms, the costs and
benefits that arise in communicating the scope of property rights in
general and of patent rights in particular. Part III discusses important
sources of uncertainty in communications regarding patent scope and
14. See, e.g., BESS EN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 19; Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim
Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1033, 1033-35 (2007); Lefstin, supra note 8, at 1026; Mullally, supra note 9, at 350; F. Scott
Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present PatentObtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REv. 55, 110 (2003) (contending that patentees should "simply
draft[] a better patent disclosure at the outset"); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 52 FJd 967, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (contending that judges should determine
the "true and consistent scope of the patent owner's rights"), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
15. See infra notes 198-199 and accompanying text.
16. Bender, supra note 13, at 209 ("Before proposing a solution to the Markman problem,
we need to understand why uncertainty and unpredictability exist in claim construction."); see
also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 53 (lamenting the use of "vague" words in patents); cf
Hubbard, supra note 7, at 406 n.28 (noting that "intellectual property sometimes lacks clear
boundaries").
17. Topliffv. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892).
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the ways these sources of uncertainty limit the utility of analogizing
the clarification of a patent's scope to the clarification of real property
boundaries, contract terms, or statutory language. Part III also argues
that it is inefficient to improve communications regarding the scope
of all patents through lengthier, more detailed patent applications
because the vast majority of patents have no value. Relying on the
earlier discussions of the reasons for uncertainty in patent scope, Part
IV argues that clarifying the scope of patents after they have issued is
more efficient than attempting to fully define scope ex ante. This Part
recommends that certain patent law doctrines be adjusted to reflect
the need for some ex post clarification. Moreover, because ex post
clarification cannot be eliminated, efficiency is promoted by making
such ex post delineation cheaper. This Part therefore recommends
expanding current administrative procedures before the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to provide for cheap
clarification of patent scope. Part V concludes by summarizing this
article's analysis and proposals.
II. COMMUNICATING RIGHTS

A. General Considerations
Property law controls the legal relations between various actors
by granting owners rights and imposing correlative duties on others. 18
For example, the owner of a parcel of land has the right to limit, to a
considerable degree, who may enter the parcel, when they may enter
it, and what they may do while on the property. For property rights to
have any effective meaning, their parameters must be communicated
to owners, to duty holders, and to authorities. 19 Indeed, because the
essence of property rights is their capacity to impact the behavior of
the holders of rights and duties, these rights are substantially defined

18. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465,468
(2004); see Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1105, 1117 (2003); see, e.g., WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS AS ApPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 36-38 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1964)
(discussing rights and duties in terms of fundamental correlative relationships). In contrast, tort
law imposes duties on property owners-for example, the duty of care owed to entrants on an
owner's or tenant's land. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 232-38 (2000).
19. This article addresses property rights and not general human rights. Though some
rights may be considered "self evident," the identification and communication of such rights is
beyond the scope of this article.

332

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. l.J.

[Vol. 25

2o
by their communication. In other words, a "right" that cannot be
communicated is hardly a right at al1. 21
All communication, including communication regarding
property rights, entails costs, including both the costs required to
communicate successfully and the losses resulting from failed
communication. Efforts to communicate successfully should therefore
be limited so that the marginal costs of increased success do not
exceed the marginal benefits,z2 Because of this efficiency concern,
some communications costs need not be incurred despite their
capacity to promote successful communication. For example, owners
of real property typically are not required to build fences that
communicate the location of boundaries, even though such fences
would likely improve communication.23
Communication requires the drafting and sending of a message
and interpretation of the message by the recipient. 24 Thus, the
informational content of a communication can be affected by both the
message and the rules of interpretation, which are often
communicated independently from the message. In some instances,
the message contains much information, while rules of interpretation
inject relatively little additional information. For example, in the
spoken phrase, "The British soldiers are coming by sea,"
interpretation requires only an understanding of verbal English,

20. See STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 69-74 (1990) (arguing that
property requires communication via "physical manifestations"); Long, supra note IS, at 495
(noting that "[i]information costs loom large in property law generally, and even more so in
intellectual property"); see also Smith, supra note IS, at 1126 (noting that "[l]aw involves
communication of information").
21. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 3S-39 (rev. ed. 1969) ("[T]he
attempt to create and maintain a system of legal rules may miscarry in at least eight ways[,
including] ... a failure to publicize, or at least make available to the affected party, the rules he
is expected to observe .... ").
22. See Smith, supra note IS, at IIOS; Hubbard, supra note 7, at 412-13; see also Long,
supra note IS, at 477-7S, 547-4S (discussing communication costs for patents and copyrights).
23. Long, supra note IS, at 4S2 (noting that "fences or other such markers indicate
boundaries in a way that [are] usually easy to interpret"); Hubbard, supra note 7, at 405; see also
infra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing the use of fencing to improve
communication). Sometimes, the marginal benefit of requiring fences does exceed the costs, and
land owners may be required to build fences, such as when their property includes an attractive
nuisance. See, e.g., Henson ex rei. Hunt v. Inl'l Paper Co., 650 S.E.2d 74, SI n.7 (S.C. 2007)
("[W]here a landowner defines the borders of his property ... by fence or other barrier, and
such fence or barrier is of a type that should reasonably be expected to exclude children or to
place children on notice that their presence is not welcome, recovery for injuries to child
trespassers should generally be precluded.").
24. Mullally, supra note 9, at 336 ("[A]ll written documents ... require interpretation to
give them effect.").
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something fairly common in the North American colonies. On the
other hand, interpretation may add substantial information. 25 Lanterns
raised in the Old North Church in Boston convey, by themselves, no
information regarding British troop movements. American
revolutionaries needed to understand the detailed and specific rule of
interpretation of "one if by land, two if by sea" for two lanterns to
communicate that the British soldiers were coming by sea. Because
communication involves both messages and rules of interpretation,
the degree of reliance on one aspect or the other can impact the
success of communication. 26 Therefore, evaluating the efficiency of
different communication techniques requires consideration of both
aspects to determine the best coordinated balance between messages
·
. 27
an d ru Ies 0 f mterpretatIon.
Communicating property rights through messages and rules of
interpretation is particularly difficult for many reasons. For example,
property rights frequently are complex, and may vary in their effects
on different classes of people. Complex rules authorize police to enter
a private owner's real property in circumstances where the general
population may not. Similarly, different classes of audiences may also
require different types of messages. A potential buyer may research
public deeds to learn who owns a lot in order to negotiate for its
purchase. In contrast, a passing hiker need only know the boundary of
the parcel; the identity of the owner is not important. Thus, a sign or
fence is generally sufficient to communicate to hikers. Property rights
may also apply only in certain places, as with a license to use a
trademark in one franchise location. Property rights may be limited to
certain objects, like personal food kept in a communal refrigerator.

25.

FRED I. DRETSKE, KNOWLEDGE AND THE FLOW OF INFORMATION 42-43 (1999).

26. The author previously described techniques for communicating efficiently by
focusing on "messages" and "methods." Hubbard, supra note 7, at 402-03. Methods are similar
to rules of interpretation but broader in that methods also involve the mechanism for
transmitting a message. For example, colonial Bostonians used a message ("one" or "two") and
rules of interpretation ("one ifby land, two ifby sea") as well as an effective method (the use of
lanterns to communicate quickly over a long distance). Efficient communication requires
consideration of all aspects of the exchange of information.
27. Perhaps the simplest combination of messages and rules of interpretation arises with
usufructuary rights to public resources, like space on a beach or seats in a movie theater. The use
of a resource is itself the message. The rule of interpretation is very straightforward: "current
use allows continued use." Saving seats for a person who is absent is more complicated. One
seat can clearly be saved, while saving a whole row in a crowded theater would not be
permitted. Where is the line? Given their simplicity, usufructs arise almost spontaneously in
novel
contexts,
such
as
on-line
computer
games.
See
WoW
Wiki,
http://www.wowwiki.comlMining (last visited Nov. 11,2008) (discussing the proper etiquette
regarding the use ofresources for "mining" in a popular on-line game).
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Property rights may also impact only certain uses or activities. Zoning
restrictions, for instance, may prohibit commercial development in a
residential neighborhood. Despite this complexity, the communication
of property rights is expected to be constant and consistent over their
duration, which can last for many years.28 Where the class of duty
holders for a property right is large and undefined, the entitlement
must also be communicated to a broad audience. 29 Even if the right
will affect only a small part of that audience, widespread
communication may be necessary because it is frequently unclear ex
ante which potential duty holders will be directly affected. For
example, real property boundaries are potentially communicated to
the entire world via publicly recorded deeds, even though only a
much smaller set of persons actually will interact with a particular
parcel of land.
As with any communication, efficiently defining and conveying
complex entitlements like property rights to recipients requires
coordination between messages and rules of interpretation.
Sometimes, the messages provide the bulk of the information
regarding some aspect of a property right and employ only simple
translation rules. For example, the physical contours of the space from
which the owner of a parcel of land can exclude a third party are
communicated with highly detailed messages-the two-dimensional
boundaries of the plot of land. Once those boundaries are determined,
the "ad ceo/urn" principle defines the three-dimensional limits of the
owners' property rights. 3o
On the other hand, communication may rely less on detailed
messages and more on rich translation rules. For example, the
temporal scope of interests in real property has historically been
limited to five different categories: "the fee simple absolute, the
defeasible fee simple, the fee tail, the life estate, and the lease.,,31
These category designations by themselves do not convey much
information about the legal interests to which they relate. Instead,
28. MUNZER, supra note 20, at 29, 79 (discussing the importance of expectations and
property).
29. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.l. I, 26-27 (2000); Hubbard, supra note
7,at418.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 em!. g (1965) ("Sir Edward Coke once
gave the utterance to the statement that 'cujus est solum, ejus est usgue ad ceolum,' which, taken
literally, means that he who owns the soil owns upward unto heaven. This has been repeated in
many cases .... "); JESSE DUKEMINIER & lAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 133 (4th ed. 1998);
Smith, supra note 18, at 1116.
31. Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 13; see also Hubbard, supra note 7, at 407-08.
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each of these categories corresponds to a detailed set of legal
principles and complicated rules for interpreting these messages (as
many law students can attest). For example, merely indicating that a
person owns a "fee simple" does not communicate the temporal scope
of the property right unless the term "fee simple" is understood. 32
Perhaps for this reason, land owners are largely prevented by
"numerus clausus" from creating new interests in land. 33 Such a new
interest would require that other owners and third parties learn a new
rule of interpretation in order to understand the meaning of the new
legal interest. 34
Whether detailed messages or robust interpretation rules better
promote efficient communication may depend upon whether senders
or receivers are better suited to bear particular communication costS. 35
Requiring more detailed messages raises costs for those who create
and send them. 36 For example, if the law required the boundaries of
all parcels of land to be identified with fences, owners would incur
additional costS. 37 On the other hand, learning and applying
interpretation rules requires investment by the recipients of the
messages. 38 This article focuses on efficiency and, thus, on the desire
to impose communication costs on the parties that can most cheaply
bear or reduce them. 39 Where persons with knowledge can convey
that information more cheaply than third parties can independently
discover it,40 ceteris paribus, those with knowledge should be
required to incur costs to communicate it. 41 Similarly, requmng
32. Moreover, the temporal scopes of some of these categories require further
explanation, such as the term of the lease.
33. Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 13; Hubbard, supra note 7, at 407.
34.
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 397 (2002);
Hubbard, supra note 7, at 410; see also Long, supra note 18, at 468, 546 (noting that "[s]ui
generis forms of protection raise information costs along one margin-that of comprehending
legal rules").
35. Hubbard, supra note 7, at 423.
36. Smith, supra note 18, at 1132 (noting that a "shorter message is cheaper to produce");
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE LJ. 557, 562-63
(1992).
37. Hubbard, supra note 7, at 412.
38. Smith, supra note 18, at 1108, 1132, 1139; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 34, at
397; Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 8; Hubbard, supra note 7, at 410; see also Long, supra
note 18, at 468,546 (noting that "[s]ui generis forms of protection raise information costs along
one margin-that of comprehending legal rules").
39. Hubbard, supra note 7, at 423; see also Mullally, supra note 9, at 381 (discussing the
importance of "properly allocat[ing] burdens" in communicating patent scope).
40. Hubbard, supra note 7, at 423-27.
41. Jd. at 423.
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recipients of messages to learn complicated interpretation rules, like
the meanings of the different legal interests in real property, promotes
efficient communication where those rules allow for successful
communication using cheap, easy-to-produce messages. 42 Efficiency
may also be promoted when communication costs are borne by a
party that can use messages or rules of interpretation in multiple
communications and thereby amortize costS. 43 For example, although
a complicated rule of interpretation may be initially expensive to
create and learn, it may nevertheless promote efficiency if it can be
applied in a great many communications. Finally, it may be more
efficient for communications to fail if successful communication is
not cost effective.
B. Patent Rights and the Role of Claim Construction
Like other types of property rights, the details of a patent's scope
are communicated using messages and rules for interpreting those
messages. The primary sources of messages regarding patent rights
are patent applications and the patents themselves. 44 An application
(and subsequently a patent) is comprised of a "specification" that
"conclude[ s] with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as
his invention.,,45 The specification contains a detailed description of
the invention, but the "claims... pointing out... the subject
matter,,46 are the most important messages regarding patent scope.
Indeed, these claims are often viewed as defining the "metes and
bounds" of the patent. 47 However, each patent claim typically consists
of only a single, densely-written sentence. 48 Given this relative
brevity, understanding the meaning of patent claims requires
substantial interpretation. 49 In other words, the communication of a
patent's scope heavily relies on a system of robust interpretation
rules.
42. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 13.
43. See Kaplow, supra note 36, at 563; Hubbard, supra note 7, at 427-28.
44. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 238.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); see also MUNZER, supra note 20, at 73 (discussing the use of
the patent specification to communicate the scope of patent rights).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
47. Cotropia, supra note 9, at 70 (claiming that "[o]nce a claim's meaning is determined,
the exact location of the patent's metes and bounds are known"); Bender, supra note 13, at 21415; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 839, 845 (1990).
48. Mullally, supra note 9, at 349.
49. See id. at 336.
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This system is based on several well-accepted rules of
interpretation. 50 First, each claim is interpreted in the context of the
entire patent document, including other claims 51 and the other parts of
the specification. For example, the textual context in which a word is
used may be considered. 52 Indeed, a patentee is allowed to act as his
or her own "lexicographer," and thus to imbue a term with an
idiosyncratic meaning that predominates over the term's ordinary
meaning. 53 Second, claim interpretation may also take into account
the record of all of the proceedings before the USPTO leading up to
the patent's issuance. 54 Third, in addition to these intrinsic evidentiary
sources, the meaning of a word in a claim is based on the "ordinary
and customary" meaning of the term to a person having ordinary skill
in the art (often abbreviated "PHOSITA") relevant to the invention at
the time of the invention. 55 A PHOSITA, however, is defined by "the
art" and not the words of the patent. Understanding the perspective of
this idealized audience may require reliance on information separate
and apart from the history of the patent, such as dictionaries, treatises,
expert testimony, or other extrinsic sources regarding relevant
scientific principles and the state of the art. 56
To some extent, patent law requires the use of claims in order to
foster greater certainty about the scope of patent rights. For example,
claims are easy to locate, as they always appear at the end of the
patent. 57 In light of these features, claims are often described as
providing sufficient "notice" of the scope of patent rights. 58 However,
this notice is somewhat fictional because claim construction is far
from being an exact science, and reasonable people often disagree
regarding the construction of crucial terms. Even though the
50. See infra notes 102-110 and accompanying text (discussing canons of interpretation
for patents).
51. For example, claims can be drafted as either "independent" or "dependent," with
dependent claims "contain[ing] a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specii)'[ing]
a further limitation of the subject matter claimed." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). Dependant claims
thus provide additional clarification to independent claims.
52.

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).

53. ld. at 1313; see Joseph Scott Miller, EnhanCing Patent Disclosure for Faithfol Claim
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. Rev. 177,204 (2005).
54.

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.

ld. at 1313.
ld. at 1314.
ld. at 1311-12; 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
58. MullalIy, supra note 9, at 334. But see John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The
Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 160 (2005)
55.
56.
57.

(noting that, because of the Doctrine of Equivalents, "it has never been the law that the claims
provide the entirety of the metes and bounds of the patent rights").
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construction of a patent claim often controls the outcome of an
infringement dispute,59 claim construction is frequently unpredictable.
The Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review claim
constructions in cases arising under the patent laws,6o changes district
court claim constructions in nearly one third of patent cases. 61
Moreover, a substantial number of claim constructions by the Federal
Circuit issue with dissents. 62
Unfortunately, uncertainty regarding claim scope in issued
patents can engender substantial costs and undermine efficient
innovation. 63 An audience reviewing the patent may incorrectly
construe the patent too narrowly, prompting unintentional
infringement that otherwise could have been cheaply avoided had the
infringer correctly understood the patent claims. 64 Incorrectly
interpreting a patent too broadly may also result in inefficiency.
Fearing infringement, a person may avoid productive activities that
are not protected by the patent or pay unnecessary royalties to the
patent owner. Because such royalties foster deadweight loss, they do
not effectively promote innovation. 65 Finally, inefficiency results
because of the high administrative costs of determining the scope of a
patent. 66 Where it is unclear whether a patentee has construed a patent
too broadly or whether an alleged infringer has construed it too
narrowly, this uncertainty often leads to expensive litigation. 67

59. Mullally, supra note 9, at 337.
60. 28 U.s.c. § 1295 (2000).
61. Osenga, supra note 8, at 65.
62. Lefstin, supra note 14, at 1037; Thomas, supra note 58, at 163; see, e.g., Acumed
LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 FJd 800,814 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Agfa Corp. v. Creo Prods. Inc., 451
F.3d 1366, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2006); nCube Corp. v. SeaChange Int'l, Inc., 436 FJd 1317, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2006); PhiIlips v. AWH Corp., 415 FJd at 1303, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
63. Mullally, supra note 9, at 335 (noting that "claims play the dispositive role in
balancing competing interests in the law of invention"); MiIler, supra note 53, at 196; see also
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 46 (extolling the benefits of clear notice of property
boundaries); Long, supra note 18, at 502.
64. See Mullally, supra note 9, at 366; Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup
and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2008-10 (2007). A patent examiner could also
misconstrue the scope of the claims in a patent application and allow an invalid patent to issue
that may be used to restrict commercially beneficial activities without any concomitant boon to
innovation.
65. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 53, at 199; Bender, supra note 13.
66. Cf GUIDO CALABRESl, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 225-26 (1970) (discussing
administrative costs).
67. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 120-38 (discussing the costs of patent litigation).
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III. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS
UNCERTAINTY IN COMMUNICATING PATENT SCOPE

Many scholars have criticized patent law for the uncertainty, and
associated costs, involved with claim construction. 68 Despite this
widespread criticism, scholars have not adequately addressed the
sources of this uncertainty or the relative costs of alternatives that
might reduce it. 69 The first omission is important because it is not
possible to develop workable remedies to reduce uncertainty without
a proper understanding of its causes. 70 For example, comparisons
between patents and other legal concepts like real property, contracts,
or statutes may not help to improve communications regarding patent
scope because patents and other legal instruments involve different
obstacles to clear communication. The failure to address the relative
costs and benefits of methods to improve communications regarding
patent scope results in proposals that fail to appreciate that uncertainty
is often difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate and that some
methods to reduce it are better than others.

A. Textual Sources of Uncertainty
1.

The use of Words in a World of Factual Uncertainty

A major source of uncertainty regarding the scope of patents is
that patents are based largely on written words/I which are inherently
imprecise to a considerable extent. 72 The words of a patent claim are

68. Mullally, supra note 9, at 343 ("A perceived lack of certainty, in the sense of
predictability of results (e.g., claim, scope, or meaning), has been the basis for much criticism of
patent law in general, and claim construction specifically .... " (footnotes omitted)); see, e.g.,
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 46-72; Thomas, supra note 58, at 165; Cotropia, supra note
9, at 98-99. Some of the criticism regarding the clarity of claim scope stems from the Federal
Circuit's inconsistent jurisprudence regarding the proper methodology for construing patent
claims. In 2005, the Federal Circuit attempted to harmonize its jurisprudence through the en
banc decision Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The uncertainty
stemming from inconsistent case law has therefore been largely addressed and is accordingly not
the subject of this article.
69. Cf Thomas, supra note 58, at 165 (noting the "industrial uncertainty" in patent scope
stemming from sources other than indeterminate patent claims).
70. See a/so Cotropia, supra note 9, at 100 (noting that some commentary "begs the
question of whether any [claim construction] methodology can produce absolute certainty in
claim meaning").
71. Patents may also be communicated using drawings and samples.
72. Bender, supra note 13, at 209 ("To some extent, the nature of language and the
purpose of patent claims make absolute clarity impossible."); see Lawrence M. Solan, Why
Laws Work Pretty Well, but Not Great: Words and Ru/es in Lega/Interpretation, 26 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 243, 244 (2001); see a/so Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391,

340

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & I-UGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 25

the primary messages by which patent scope is determined and
communicated, though additional messages about patent scope also
appear in the specification. 73 These messages, along with the accepted
rules for their interpretation, provide relatively clear core concepts,
but uncertainty inevitably intrudes at the margins. However, despite a
wealth of legal scholarship addressing the imprecision of language in
non-patent contexts, patent-law scholars often fail to recognize this
inherent obstacle to patent-scope certainty.
Words are imprecise because, for example, they have multiple
meanings, and it may not be clear which meaning is intended. 74 For
example, rock may refer to a stone, a type of music, a rocking
movement, etc. Even when it is clear which meaning of a word a
speaker intended to use, whether that meaning includes a particular
concept may be unclear. 75 The possible scope of a specific meaning of
an individual word itself does not have clear linguistic boundaries. 76
Words are often understood as focusing on certain "prototypes" or
"plain cases.,,77 For instance, "rock", when used to reference stone,
clearly includes materials like granite, slate, and marble. The further
that a concept strays from prototypical examples, the more difficult
the classification becomes. 78 As H.L.A. Hart observed, "uncertainty at
the borderline is the price to be paid for the use of general classifying
terms in any form of communication concerning matters of fact.,,79
396 (Ct. CI. 1967) ("The very nature of words would make a clear and unambiguous claim a
rare occurrence.").
73. A full discussion of the imprecision oflanguage is beyond the scope of this article.
74. Dan 1. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK 1.
REv. 29,40 (2005).
75. Long, supra note 18, at 506 ("Some degree of ambiguity will be irreducible.").
76. Solan, supra note 72, at 257 (noting that "concepts have fuzzy boundaries ... [and]
some examples of words are better than others").
77. HART, supra note 12, 126 (noting that there will be "plain case[s for which] the
general terms seem to need no interpretation and where the recognition of instances seems
unproblematic or 'automatic' .... "); see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 32 ("The text of
patent claims may ... lack[] a sharp outer perimeter, but usually situated [sic] within a particular
core range of meaning."); Andrew Auchincloss Lundgren, Perspectives on Patent Claim
Construction: Re-Examining Markman v. Westview Instruments Through Linguistic and
Cognitive Theories of Decisionmaking, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 173 (2004) (discussing
prototypical meanings of words); Solan, supra note 72, at 257.
78. See HART, supra note 12, at 127 (noting that whether a concept satisfies a legal rule
depends upon "the criteria of relevance and closeness of resemblance"); see also Osenga, supra
note 8, at 107 (noting that narrow claim constructions based on generally accepted meanings
provide better notice than meanings that incorporate less widely accepted meanings); see also
Solan, supra note 72, at 257.
79. HART, supra note12, at 128; see also Long, supra note 18, at 471 ("Despite the best
efforts of individuals and the presence of formal and informal rules, property rights remain
ambiguous around the edges.").

2009] IMPORTANCE OF "EX POST PAHNT DHINATION

341

For example, in a communication regarding "rocks," it may not be
clear whether "rock" includes gravel (small rock?), sand (very small
rock?), chalk dust (very, very small rock?), salt (rock salt?), or cement
(if shaped, textured, and colored to resemble rock). Moreover, people
may disagree whether a factual scenario is sufficiently similar to a
prototype or plain case to fall within the definition of a word. Some
people, for example, may consider rock salt to be a rock, while others
do not. Determining whether a word includes a particular factual
scenario may therefore involve subjective considerations based on
past experiences. so
Another reason that patent claims are necessarily unclear stems
from the difficulty of using words to create laws in a world of factual
uncertainty.s1 By describing certain activities that can only be
undertaken with permission from the patentee, patent claims establish
laws, albeit of limited application. Uncertainty in law stems, in part,
from what Hart calls the indeterminacy of fact, which reflects our
ignorance of "all the possible combinations of circumstances which
the future may bring."s2 When words are assembled to create laws
(including patent claims), the indeterminacy of fact gives rise to
another form of uncertainty: "indeterminacy of aim."s3 Because we
cannot foresee all relevant factual scenarios when we are formulating
rules, we cannot consider how to treat those unforeseen
circumstances. 84 Although careful word selection and forethought
may limit indeterminacies to a certain extent, it is unlikely that
thought and drafting can entirely eliminate them because, as Hart

80. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 51; see also Solan, supra note 72, at 263. Dan
Burk and Mark Lemley have argued that uncertainty in the meaning of patent claims also stems
from the different ways that words in a claim can be grouped into elements:
Define an element narrowly-limit it to a single word, say-and you will tend to
narrow the resulting patent, because to prove infringement the patentee must
show that each word has a corresponding structure in the accused device. By
contrast, defining an element broadly tends to broaden the patent, because it
permits the text to be read on a greater range of accused devices.
Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 30, 44-45.
81. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 36 ("Thus, even so-called literal claim
interpretation occurs at a relatively high level of abstraction, as no text is 'literally' found in the
claimed invention-only a correspondingly described physical structure.").
82. HART, supra note 12, at 128; see also Mullally, supra note 9, at 376 ("The transaction
costs of specifying every possible form of each aspect of the invention, even assuming that they
can be foreseen, may exceed the gains."); see also Kaplow, supra note 36, at 600 (noting that
"another limitation on the ability to formulate laws as rules involves limitations oflanguage").
83. HART, supra note 12, at 128.
84. See id. at 129; see also Long, supra note 18, at 512.
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cautioned, "we are men, not godS.,,85 Rather, uncertainty is typically
revealed when a new factual scenario arises, and "something in the
nature of a choice between open alternatives must be made by
whoever is to resolve them.,,86
With patents, the uncertainty created by open-textured meanings
is particularly troubling. Under the Constitution, patents must protect
the discoveries of inventors. 87 By definition, discoveries and
inventions often involve changing, cutting-edge technology.
However, both the future state of that technology and its terminology
may be unsettled,88 and infringement claims may not be brought until
years after the patent was issued. 89 In addition, the lack of widely
accepted terminology may prompt a patent applicant to use a word
unconventionally,90 thereby placing the use of the word well outside
of familiar prototypes. 91 The meanings of words may also fluctuate
over time as new terminology becomes standardized. 92 Indeed, the
Federal Circuit has warned that "[a] particular term used in one patent
need not have the same meaning when used in an entirely separate
patent, particularly one involving different technology.,,93 Moreover,
infringing devices or processes may not resemble the specific
invention that gave rise to the patent in the first place. 94 Consequently,
at the time a patent is drafted, it may be particularly difficult to

85. HART, supra note 12, at 128. Some factual scenarios that appear obvious in retrospect
may stem more from hindsight bias than foreseeability. Cj KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127
S. Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007) (discussing the dangers of hindsight bias when reviewing the
obviousness of an invention).
86. HART, supra note 12, at 127.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
88. See Osenga, supra note 8, at 66; see also Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell,
Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("The courts have recognized, particularly in fields
of new and evolving knowledge, that the claims can be no more precise than the knowledge in
the field permits.").
89. Indeed, through continuation applications, patents may issue years after an
application was filed.
90. See Osenga, supra note 8, at 97.
91. Certain concepts, including the meanings of words, may be more psychologically
prominent than others-a concept sometimes described as "salience." Smith, supra note 18, at
1129. Two persons are more likely to consider a meaning salient when they share substantial
background information. Smith, supra note 18, at 1129. With technologies and terminology in
flux, such background commonality may be less common, and notions of salience accordingly
may not encourage different people to interpret patent terms similarly.
92. See Thomas, supra note 58, at 162-63; see also Smith, supra note 18, at 1181 (noting
that words do not have constant meanings).
93. Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. CiT. 2005).
94. See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1802 (2007).
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envlSlon all of the factual scenarios related to infringement in the
future and thus difficult to decide which of those future scenarios
should be declared to fall within the scope of the patent. 95 In short, the
indeterminacies of fact and aim are particularly magnified with
patents. 96
The difficulties with ex ante communication of patent scope are
increased because of problems with ex ante identification of the
proper scope of patents. Efficient achievement of the constitutional
goal of patents-"promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,,97-requires that patent scope correlate with the breadth of an
inventor's discovery.98 Because of the indeterminacies noted above,
however, the relationship between an invention and later technology
may not be foreseeable. 99 As a result of the inability to identify patent
scope ex ante in terms of future technology, scope cannot be
accurately conceived, much less precisely communicated. No matter
how detailed or precise an ex ante delineation of patent scope is, that
scope likely correlates inaccurately with the proper innovationpromoting scope of the invention.

95.
Cf McCullogh v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 385 (1819) ("How unwise would it have
been, to legislate immutably for exigencies which had not then occurred, and which must have
been seen but dimly and imperfectly!"). Indeed, some scholars have suggested that patent law
needs revision because it allows for the patenting of items and technology that materially differ
from the "paradigmatic assets" for which patent law was originally designed. Long, supra note
18, at 470,542.
96. HART, supra note 12, at 126 (noting that "plain cases" include those that are "familiar
ones, constantly recurring in similar contexts"). Jeffrey Lefstin has argued that claim
construction is not particularly indeterminate when compared to other legal issues because the
incidence of dissent in Federal Circuit opinions addressing claim construction is not
significantly greater than the rate of dissent in other types of patent-law decisions. Lefstin, supra
note 14, at 1044. Lefstin does not dispute, however, that claim construction may be somewhat
indeterminate and instead contends that it is not especially indeterminate in comparison to other
legal issues. Moreover, certain assumptions that Lefstin made in his study undermine its
persuasiveness. For example, Lufkin assumes that the likelihood of dissent does not vary
between issues except based on the indeterminateness of those issues. Judges may, however, be
more likely to dissent on issues that have effect as precedent, and claim constructions are
unlikely to be applied in multiple lawsuits. Indeed, Lefstin admits that some of his assumptions
are "not precise." Lefstin, supra note 8, at 1083-84. A full examination of Lefstin's detailed
study is beyond the scope of this article.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38
F.3d 551, 558 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
98. See Contropia, supra note 9, at 106-07; Long, supra note 18, at 480 (defining the
novel aspect of an invention as the difference between the invention and the prior art).
99. Merges & Nelson, supra note 47, at 848 (noting that "no one knows what future
developments will follow" a patent).
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The Limits of Interpretive Rules

Like any communication, words in patents require interpretation,
which may eliminate many potential meanings for many words and
may help clarify the scope of individual meanings. Interpretation is
particularly important with patent claims because they are such
densely written statements. 100 Rules of interpretation, however, suffer
from their own form of linguistic indeterminacy because they, like the
messages they are designed to interpret, are communicated and
implemented through words. lol As with any message, interpretative
rules may be clear only in typical cases.
In addition to standard rules of the English language, patent law
uses context and canons of construction to interpret patent claims.
These canons include the following:
1. Patent terms should not be construed contrary to their plain
.
102
meamng.
2. Patent terms should have consistent meaning throughout a
patent. 103
3. Patentees may be their own "lexicographers" and use terms
idiosyncratically. 104
4. Patent terms should not be construed in a manner that renders
two claims identical in scope. lOS
5. A claim should not be construed to exclude an embodiment
disclosed in the specification. 106
6. Claims should be construed in light of the specification. l07
7. Limitations in the specification should not be read into the
claim. 108

100. Patent claims are typically only a single sentence long. Osenga, supra note 8, at 65.
101. HART, supra note 12, at 126; see Mullally, supra note 9, at 378.
102. Mullally, supra note 9, at 352.
103. Id.; but see Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d
1367, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that a term used multiple times in a single claim could
be interpreted inconsistently).
104. Robert Fram et a!., Claim Construction and Implicit Definitions Based on the
Specification Since Phillips, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 65 (2007) (describing factors a court may
consider in determining whether to implicitly limit the scope of claim terms).
105. Mullally, supra note 9, at 353; Osenga, supra note 8, at 75.
106. Mullally, supra note 9, at 353; see also Osenga, supra note 8, at 75.
107. Contropia, supra note 9, at 79 (quoting Slimfoid Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc.,
810 F.2d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987».
108. Mullally, supra note 9, at 352-53; Osenga, supra note 8, at 75; Contropia, supra note
9, at 80.
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Because these canons are vague and often conflict with each
other, they often do not provide clear guidance on claim
construction. 109 For example, the role of the specification in
construing the meaning of a claim term is indeterminate. On the one
hand, claims should be construed in light of the specification (number
6 above), and the specification may indicate that a patentee acted as
his or her own lexicographer and used a term idiosyncratically to be
narrower than the term is usually defined (number 3 above). On the
other hand, limitations from the specification should not be read into
the claims (number 7 above). Reconciling these two canons is a
challenge because the difference between a "limitation" and an
idiosyncratic use is far from clear. 110
Patent interpretation is also complicated by the requirement
addressed above that claims are to be interpreted from the perspective
of an idealized audience-a person having ordinary skill in the art
(PHOSITA). III Developing this viewpoint may require substantial
information beyond the patent, including the complete prosecution
history,112 treatises, dictionaries, and expert testimony. Furthermore,
because a PHOSIT A is considered to have total knowledge of all
relevant prior art, it will be necessary to identify and to analyze
relevant prior art. 113 In short, as a result of indeterminacy, there is no
"rigid algorithm for claim construction,,,114 and "reasonable people
can[, and often do,] differ" I 15 on the proper scope of a patent.
Finally, the problems stemming from indeterminacies of
language are magnified with patents because they are created using
language. Patentees submit written patent applications to the USPTO,

109. See Patrick J. Flinn, Towards a Coherent Theory of Patent Claim Interpretation,
PATENT LITIGATION 2000507,513-14 (2000) (available at West law as 619 PLlIPAT 507); see
also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395,401 (1950) (arguing that canons
of statutory construction are indetenninate because for every canon promoting one interpretation
there is another canon supporting a conflicting construction). Commentators have also noted that
the Federal Circuit's decisions regarding the proper process for claim construction have been
inconsistent. See Osenga, supra note 8, at 64.
110. This conflict is well recognized. See Mullally, supra note 9, at 353; Osenga, supra
note 8, at 75; Contropia, supra note 9, at 81; Miller, supra note 53, at 205.
III. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
112. Patent prosecution is the process of applying for a patent and includes various
administrative procedures of the USPTO.
113. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir.
1986) ("The person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed to be aware of all
the pertinent prior art.").
114. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
115. Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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where they are evaluated by a patent examiner who determines
whether the application should be granted. I 16 The inherent
uncertainties of language may allow the examiner and the patentee to
adopt different claim constructions, with only the examiner's
construction supporting patentability. The examiner and the patentee,
however, may be unaware of the differences in their constructions or
may not create a record of it. 117 Indeed, the patentee may strategically
include open-ended language that enables the examiner to adopt a
narrow, valid construction while also allowing the patentee to argue a
broad, but invalid, construction in a later patent infringement
dispute. 1I8 Even if the court rejects the patentee's construction, it may
arrive at a construction different from the examiner and on which the
examiner would have denied the patent application.
3. The Need to Broaden Patent Scope Beyond Specific
Embodiments
An invention typically will be broader than the particular facts of
its discovery. For example, an inventor might understand that a nail,
screw, or staple would be equally appropriate to solve a problem in a
project, but elect to use a nail 'merely because it was convenient.
Patent protection should not be limited to using a nail, however,
because patent scope should be commensurate with the invention's
contribution to "the Progress of Science and useful Arts," and not
restricted by decisions based on unrelated criteria, such as
convenience. 119 This concept is captured in patent law by the
distinction between inventions and embodiments of that invention. 12o
The use of a nail is an aspect of one specific embodiment of the more
general invention, which encompasses the use of a nail, screw, or
staple. Patentees are required by statute to disclose the best

116. 35 U.S.C. §§ Ill, 131 (2000).
117. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 55, 226 (noting that "patent examiners do
not record their interpretation of the boundaries of the patent").
118. See Long, supra note 18, at 506 ("Because one way to reduce th~ costs of agreement
is to agree on less, patentees and examiners may leave patent language ambiguous so as to reach
an outcome faster."). Patent examiners generally cannot provide their interpretations of patent
claims in later infringement litigation. 37 C.F.R. § 104.23 (2007).
119. See Cotropia, supra note 9, at 106-07 (discussing cases that correlate patent
protection with the scope of the invention); Long, supra note 18, at 480 (defining the innovative
contribution of an invention as the difference between the invention and the prior art); Merges &
Nelson, supra note 47, at 845-48 (noting the importance of patents covering "minor variations"
on the inventor's work).
120. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 199.
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embodiment--called the "best mode"-for practicing the invention. 121
Patentees are also required to provide sufficient written description of
the more general invention to demonstrate that it was firmly held
within the patentee's mind at the time the application was
submitted. 122 The distinction between the invention and its
embodiments is also important in claim construction. The Federal
Circuit has noted that, courts should not "confine their definitions of
terms to the exact representations depicted in the embodiments" listed
in the specification. 123
Thus, in order to correlate patent protection with the scope of the
invention, patent rights must be broadened beyond the initial
embodiment that led to the filing of a patent application. 124 Patent law
provides for implicit and explicit broadening, but both approaches
engender substantial uncertainty. First, patent scope is implicitly
expanded through the Doctrine of Equivalents. Literal infringement of
patent is shown when an accused device or process practices every
element of a patent claim. 125 The Doctrine of Equivalents, in contrast,
expands patent protection to devices and process that are technically
different but substantively equivalent. 126 The doctrine measures
equivalency element by element and provides that a device or process
infringes a patent even if the device or process contains elements that
insubstantially differ from the elements of the patent. 127 Under this
approach, elements are equivalent if they perform the same function

121. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
122. See 35 U.S.c. § 112 (2000); see also Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555,
1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the written description requirement of § 112 provides that
the applicant must "convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing
date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention").
123. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
124. Miller, supra note 53, at 184 ("To specify the full range of marketplace conduct that a
patent claim empowers the patentee to exclude, we confront a tension that arises necessarily
from trying to grasp the world of things-actual inventions in real space-with words.").
125. ACCD Brands, Inc. v. Micro Sec. Devices, Inc., 346 F.3d 1075, 1080 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
126. See Thomas, supra note 58, at 156 (noting that the Doctrine of Equivalents
"expand[s] the reach of a patent's claims beyond their literal language"); see also Miller, supra
note 53, at 185 ("The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all
equivalents to the claims described" (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-32 (2002))); Lichtman, supra note 13, at 152.
127. See Thomas, supra note 58, at 157 (discussing the requirement that equivalency be
measured element by element); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17,
29 (1997).
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in the same way to achieve the same result. 128 For example, if a patent
claim described the use of a nail to connect two things, a court might
find equivalent the use of a screw. 129 Absent this doctrine, competitors
could avoid infringement through minor changes to the claimed
invention, like substituting a screw for a nail. 130 Consequently, the
Doctrine of Equivalents improves the correlation between patent
scope and the inventor's contribution to "the Progress of Science and
useful Arts." The Doctrine of Equivalents, however, is an imprecise
and uncertain means of expanding patent scope because resolving
disputes regarding whether two different activities should be
considered "equivalent" often requires litigation. l31 This uncertainty
places substantial costs on patent audiences, including both the costs
of attempting to apply the doctrine and the costs from erroneously
determining the extent to which the doctrine expands a patent beyond
its literal scope. 132
The second mechanism for broadening patent scope is that patent
applicants can explicitly use broad claim terms to correlate patent
scope with innovation. 133 For example, if an inventor used a nail in
the initial embodiment of an invention, the inventor might file a
patent application referencing a "connector" so that it will not be

128. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 39. The elements of the patent are atomistic
concepts, and a single claim limitation may contain multiple elements. See, e.g., id. at 32
(characterizing as a separate "element" a number in range in a phrase in a claim limitation).
129. Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 37.
130. See Thomas, supra note 58, at 156.
131. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 61; Thomas, supra note 58, at 156, 169-75;
Lichtman, supra note 13, at 152; Kieff, supra note 14, at 109-110.
132. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 61-62; Warner Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29
("There can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents ... conflicts with the definitional and
public notice functions of the statutory claim requirement."); see supra notes 63-67 and
accompanying text.
133. Patentees may also use broad, open-textured terms in an attempt to convince an
examiner to allow a patent to issue, rather than to more accurately describe their invention.
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 239; Long, supra note 18, at 506; Bender, supra note 13, at
210-11. The patent examiner might construe an unclear term in a patent application narrowly so
that it excludes prior art from the scope of the claims and use this construction to allow the
patent to issue. BESSEN &. MEURER, supra note 8, at 57 (noting that "patent applicants
sometimes game the system by drafting ambiguous patent claims that can be read narrowly
during examination such that they avoid a novelty rejection"); Bender, supra note 13, at 190.
Although a patent examiner has a duty to evaluate a draft claim in a patent application using the
broadest reasonable interpretation, Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., L.P., 323 F.3d
989,995 (Fed. CiT. 2003), a patent examiner may nevertheless use a narrower construction than
later used by a patent owner in litigation. Indeed, different patent examiners are more prone to
require alterations of claim language, which indicates that different examiners tend to interpret
claims differently. Lichtman, supra note 13, at 155, 170.
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limited to a nail. 134 Because patent applicants must always describe at
least one embodiment of the invention, such as the best mode of
practicing the invention,135 a patentee who uses broad claim terms can
supplement the Doctrine of Equivalents by providing additional
information regarding the invention in the form of a more general
description. 136 In this way, broad claim terms are a small but
meaningful enhancement to communication regarding patent scope. 13 ?
Perhaps for this reason, patent law encourages the use of broad claim
terms. For example, if a patentee's specification covers material that
could have been claimed-but was not-the patentee cannot later claim
that foregone patent scope. 138 That portion of the invention may pass
into the public domain.
Despite its advantages, however, the use of broad claim terms
also engenders uncertainty regarding claim scope. Although all words
have uncertain meanings beyond their prototypical cores,139 the
breadth of this uncertain margin will generally be larger with broader
terms as opposed to narrower terms. For example, the uncertain
margin for "connector" may include the uncertain margins for "nail,"
"screw," and "glue." Broad terms therefore are particularly amenable
to different interpretations. Using broad claim terms can also lead to
uncertainty regarding patent scope because language often broadens
in jumps, rather than along a smooth gradient. 14o For example, if the
initial embodiment of an invention utilizes a nail to connect two

134. Kieff, supra note 14, at 111-12; see, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 205
(giving an example of the use of broad claim terms).
135. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
136. See also Lichtman, supra note 13, at 152 (arguing that the Doctrine of Equivalents
applies when claim language is imprecise). For a discussion of proposals that seek to reduce
reliance on the Doctrine of Equivalents in favor of providing greater certainty regarding the
literal scope of patent claims, see generally Thomas, supra note 58, at 169-75.
137. The use of broad claim terms may reduce uncertainty more than reliance of the
Doctrine of Equivalents because the former is more explicit than the latter. It is doubtful,
however, that the Doctrine of Equivalents could be eliminated through explicit claiming without
undermining innovation. See Lichtman, supra note 13, at 177 n.59; see also Smith, supra note
18, at 1182 (noting that "elimination of possibilities of misunderstanding will be subject to
falling marginal benefits and increasing marginal costs, and the goal is to try to equate them, not
to eliminate the potential for misunderstanding completely").
138. Thomas, supra note 58, at 159-60.
139. See supra Parts liLA. I and IILA.2.
140. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 195 (discussing the difficulty in construing
the scope of abstract patent terms); see also Smith, supra note 94, at 1755 (noting that there is
"some indeterminacy around the edges" of patents); HOHFELD, supra note 18, at 30 ("Much of
the difficulty, as regards legal terminology, arises from the fact that many of our words were
originally applicable only to physical things; so that their use in connection with legal relations
is, strictly speaking, figurative or fictional." (footnote omitted)).
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pieces of material, to capture a slightly different embodiment that
uses screws, staples, or rivets instead of nails, the patentee may use a
term broader than "nail," such as "connector." This broad term,
however, may include cases that are not materially the same as the
motivating embodiment. "Connector" includes many concepts
different from nails, screws, staples, and rivets, such as glue, Velcro,
magnetism, and gravity. Some of these means of connecting may go
beyond the invention.
Certain rules of interpretation can reduce this uncertainty. For
example, ambiguous claim terms may be construed narrowly: "Where
there is an equal choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of
a claim, and there is an enabling disclosure that indicates that the
applicant is at least entitled to a claim having the narrower meaning,
[a court may] consider the notice function of the claim to be best
served by adopting the narrower meaning.,,141 Moreover, if a claim is
"insolubly ambiguous, and no narrowing construction can properly be
adopted, [a court may hold] the claim indefinite" and thus invalid. 142
Another rule of patent law facilitates the use of broad terminology,
while simultaneously correlating patent scope with the scope of the
invention, by allowing patentees to implicitly redefine a word to be
narrower than the word's ordinary meaning. 143 For example, as noted
above, a patent applicant may use a nail in the initial embodiment of
an invention, and then use the broader term "connector" in the patent
application. If, throughout the patent specification, the applicant
describes connectors in the invention as puncturing, piercing, and
making holes, a court might later construe "connector" to exclude
glue, even though glue is a type of connector. 144 In such a case, the
court might conclude that the patentee and the examiner understood
"connector" to be limited to mechanisms that bonded by physical
rather than chemical means, and that the patentee acted as a

141. Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
see Hubbard, supra note 7, at 424.
142. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Courts rely on indefiniteness in only 5.8% of patent invalidations. John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208
(1998); see also Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1373 (noting
that a claim is not indefinite if "one skilled in the art would understand the bounds of the claim
when read in light of the specification." (quoting Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d
870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1993))).
143. Patent protection cannot be extended beyond the scope of invention. Inpro II
Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
144. See Fram et aI., supra note 104 (describing factors a court may consider in
determining whether to implicitly limit the scope of claim tenus).
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lexicographer to redefine more narrowly the word "connector" for the
purposes of the patent. The implicit limitation of claim terms has
drawbacks similar to the problems of implicit broadening of patent
scope through the Doctrine of Equivalents. Implicit limitation of
broad terms involves substantial interpretation of patent claims in
light of the specification and disagreements regarding interpretations
may develop that can only be resolved through litigation. 145
B. Analogies Between Patents and Other Legal
Communications
Courts and commentators often contend that a high level of ex
ante clarity is achieved in legal communications in such diverse areas
as real property boundaries, contracts rights, and statutes, and that,
therefore, patents can likewise be made clearer ex ante by changes in
the law. 146 These comparisons between patents and other legal
instruments are misguided both because they do not recognize the
patent-specific obstacles to communication and because they
overstate the clarity in other legal instruments. 147 As a result, such
comparisons not only often fail to provide meaningful insight into
improving communications regarding patent scope but also may result
in inefficiency and confusion. 148
145. Miller, supra note 53, at 204; Thomas, supra note 58, at 162-63. The uncertainty
resulting from implicit limitations on broad claim terms can be-and sometimes is-reduced
through more explicit claim language. Explicit yet broad claim terms cannot, however, eliminate
all uncertainty. In addition to the obstacles to drafting explicit claims noted above, see supra
Parts lILA. I and III.A.2, identifying the need for explicit limitations is difficult to anticipate ex
ante (that is, before the patent issues) because, unless a patent applicant and examiner disagree
about the scope of a term, the need for clarification may not be identified until after the patent
issues. Indeed, patentees and patent examiners are more likely to agree on the contextual,
limited meaning of a term because their communication is more personal than a formal
communication mediated only by the words of a patent. See Smith, supra note 18, at 1131.
146. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 30-33 (critiquing patent law for not providing
notice of boundaries as clear as real property law); Mullally, supra note 9, at 339 n.33
(contending that statutes and contracts "are particularly useful analogues to patents"); Osenga,
supra note 8, at 70 ("Claim construction, in many respects, is not unlike the processes of
statutory and contract interpretation that are well-worn provinces of the district court judge.");
Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 50-51 (discussing comparisons between claim construction
and statutory and contractual interpretation); Lichtman, supra note 13, at 152 (noting that patent
claim interpretation "bears an obvious resemblance to a perhaps more familiar question in
statutory interpretation").
147. But see Lefstin, supra note 8, at 1092 (arguing that claim interpretation is no more
indeterminate that contract interpretation). For a short critique of Lefstin's study, see supra note
96.
148. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 95 (2001) (arguing that "real harm" may arise from applying to intellectual
property the "systems of control" used for physical property).
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1. Patents and Real Property
Courts frequently compare patent scope to the "metes and
bounds" of real property, 149 suggesting that the former is or should be
as clear as the latter. The metes and bounds of real property, however,
describe boundaries in the current, observable world and therefore do
not suffer from the indeterminacy of fact involved with patents. 150
The location of these physical boundaries can usually be known as a
fact, and thus does not suffer from any need for "broadening.,,151
When combined with the relatively easily applied ad ceo/urn rule,
these boundaries can be translated into three dimensions by a "rigid
algorithm.,,152 Moreover, the extent to which unknown facts can be
relevant is circumscribed in a fashion entirely dissimilar to patents;
real property is frequently developed substantially within the
boundaries, not right along its edges. Indeed, development close to
the boundaries of real property may be prohibited by law, as with

149. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 622 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("In drafting an original claim of a
patent application, the writer sets out the metes and bounds of the invention .... "); Burke, Inc.
v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("A claim in a patent
provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude
others from making, using or selling the protected invention." (quoting Corning Glass Works v.
Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989))); Scaltech Inc. v.
Retec/Tetra, L.L.c., 178 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that "a claim in a patent
provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the protected invention"); Hoechst-Roussel Pharms., Inc.
v. Lehman, 109 F.3d 756, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d
654, 660 (7th Cir. 1995) ("In the patent 'bargain,' the claims define what the patentee receives,
the 'metes and bounds' from which he can exclude competitors."); Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("The legal effect of the patent
claim is to establish the metes and bounds of the patent right to exclude; this is a matter of
law."); In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("It is the claims which define
the metes and bounds of the invention entitled to the protection of the patent system."); Zenith
Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("It is the claim
that sets the metes and bounds of the invention entitled to the protection of the patent system.");
see a/so Lefstin, supra note 8, at 1025 ("A patent's claims define with words the limits of the
inventor's exclusive rights, just as physical boundaries may define the limits of real property
rights.").
150. See Long, supra note 18, at 482-83 (noting that measuring the boundaries of real
property is easier than with patents because real property is tangible).
151. Descriptions of a parcel of land within a deed can be ambiguous, but property law
relies on clear default rules to resolve such uncertainty, favoring monuments in the descriptions
of a boundary over descriptions of a course of travel, courses of travel over measurements of
distances, and distances over quantities like acreage. Hubbard, supra note 7, at 406. When
ambiguity or vagueness regarding a boundary for real property cannot be resolved, moreover,
property law does not require that the owner forfeit rights to the entire parcel of land on the
grounds that it is "invalid."
152. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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mandatory set-backs. 153 As a result, uncertainty in the location of
those boundaries is relatively unlikely to be material. I54 Patents, in
contrast, lack such a bias away from boundaries. Compared to real
property, patent infringement is more likely to occur in the uncertain
margin beyond prototypical examples. 155
The metes and bounds of real property also do not suffer from
any meaningful indeterminacy of aim because the aim in the portion
of the deed describing the boundaries is to describe the current
physical scope of the parcel in terms of easily identified, unchanging
measurements. 156 The boundary description in a deed does not
describe the full contours of the owner's rights, such as the activities
within the boundaries that the owner can engage in or prohibit. 157
Patents, on the other hand, aim to describe exactly that: activities by
third parties that infringe the patent. 158 Aiming at those activities
while ignorant of the facts of some of those activities is far more
difficult than simply describing particular physical boundaries. 159
Thus, comparing patents to parcels of land misrepresents the potential
for clear and certain patent claims. 160 It is more apt to compare patents
153. DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENS MEYER, URBAN PLANNING &
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 4.8 (2d ed. 1986).
154. Furthermore, when real property will be developed near its boundaries, greater
resources can be spent to improve certainty regarding boundary location before such
development. Such ex ante determinations are not possible with patents. See supra notes 85-94
and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
156. See generally ANDRO LINKLATER, MEASURING AMERICA: How AN UNTAMED
WILDERNESS SHAPED THE UNITED STATES AND FULFILLED THE PROMISE OF DEMOCRACY
(2002) (describing the importance of measuring techniques to systems of real property). Where
boundaries change, for example by accretion or erosion in coastal lands, there are clear default
rules. JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 44-52 (2d
ed.2002).
157. Moreover, boundaries describe only the "outline" of the property, not the full
contours of its interior. See Long, supra note 18, at 484. Land is also "well ordered" in that a
trespasser cannot somehow occupy a space interior to a boundary without crossing a property
boundary. With patents, such notions of boundaries are inapplicable.
158. See Long, supra note 18, at 499 (noting that patents "provide a thick description of
qualitative aspects of the invention").
159. See Ellickson, supra note 7, at 1327-28 (describing the reduction in monitoring costs
produced by clear boundaries). Henry Smith has argued that the regulation of the uses of
property can be placed on a spectrum from exclusion, which involves the use of boundaries as
rough proxies for activities, to governance, which addresses particular activities and particular
actors. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property
Rights, 31 1. Legal Stud. 453, 455 (2002). Governance of activities is more fine-grained but can
be more expensive than exclusion based on physical boundaries. Id. (noting that governance
strategies place a higher informational burden on duty holders).
160. Moreover, the Patent Act makes it clear that, absent contrary statutory provisions,
patents are to be treated as personal property. 35 U.S.c. § 261 (2000).
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with the activity limitations involved in real property, such as zoning,
which requires boards and commissions to address, in an ex post
context, specific issues raised by broad categorical rules.
Furthermore, because the average audience size for communicating
the boundaries of real property is likely much larger than for patents,
many communication costs can be amortized over this large group.
Even though the audience for real property may be geographically
limited, many different types of persons in that location may be
involved in communications, particularly since real property has no
temporal term, unlike patents. 161 Finally, communications regarding
real property justify greater investment in clear messages ex ante.
Most real property is valuable, and that value can justify investment,
like signs and fences, to provide a clear boundary definition. In
contrast, the vast majority of patents do not produce any revenue, and,
thus, additional investment in boundary definition regarding many
patents cannot be justified. 162
2. Patents and Contracts
Contracts enjoy substantial communication advantages over
patents. One advantage with contracts is that the parties to a contract
dispute are typically the same parties involved in the contract's
formation. For example, the core of a contract is the parties' "meeting
of the minds," which both parties will want to memorialize clearly. 163
If a dispute arises regarding the meaning of a contract term, both
parties can provide evidence regarding the "meeting of the minds."
With a patent, however, a patent examiner is involved in the creation
of the patent and an alleged infringer is involved in a later dispute
regarding patent scope. Federal regulations prevent the patent
examiner from being involved in later patent infringement
proceedings,164 and a potential future infringer has no right to

161. Smith, supra note 18, at 1184. In one sense, the life of a patent is not limited in that,
once a patent owner's rights expire, the patent passes to the public at large. The patentee,
however, does not internalize a meaningful portion of those benefits, and therefore likely does
not consider those benefits when incurring costs communicating the scope ofthe patent.
162. Mark A. Lemley has estimated that only 5% of patents produce revenue. Mark A.
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1507 (2001). Other
scholars have also argued that most patents do not have value. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER,
supra note 8, at 100 ("This suggests that the majority of patents are not worth more than a few
thousand dollars.").
163. Smith, supra note 18, at 1136. But see id. (noting that some scholars interpret contract
negotiation as "rife with conflict").
164. 37 C.F.R. § 104.23 (2007) (prohibiting employees of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office from providing "expert testimony in any legal proceedings regarding Office
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partIcIpate in the prosecution of the patents, particularly since the
patent applications are initially confidential. 165 Even if there were
such a right, the identity of an alleged infringer may not be known
until the time of infringement, which could be years after the patent
has issued.
In addition, parties to a contract can afford to expend greater
resources drafting detailed and clear messages that promote certainty.
A rational person will work to enhance the certainty of the terms of a
contract until the marginal costs of such efforts exceed their marginal
benefits. Because the vast majority of contracts provide some benefit
to the parties, the marginal benefit of increased certainty is nontrivial, and some meaningful effort may be spent on improving the
certainty of the contract. Contracts can take months and many
thousands of dollars to negotiate, and this investment is justified by
the expected benefits from the contract. In contrast, because most
patents do not yield any revenue, patentees cannot afford to invest as
much money in drafting and prosecuting patents. 166
Finally, the certainty regarding contracts should not be
overstated. Contracts undoubtedly include unclear language at times,
and many contract disputes often center on disagreements regarding
the meaning of contract terms. 167 Moreover, contract law provides for
some adjustment of contractual terms after the contract has been
entered based on unforeseen future events. For example, when
unforeseen circumstances arise, a court may construe a contract to
include terms that the parties would have negotiated had the
circumstances been known at the time the contract was signed. 168
information, subjects or activities"). In certain limited contexts, the examiner's interpretation
may be inferred. For example, if there is a strong inference that "the PTO would have
recognized that one claim interpretation would render the claim invalid, and that the PTO would
not have issued the patent assuming that to be the proper construction of the term," a court may
decide that the claim should not receive that construction. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane); see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 226
(recommending that patent examiners start recording the interpretation of claims that they use to
decide patent validity).
165. 35 U.S.c. § 122 (2000).
166. Contracts may also rely on "standardized" terminology. Smith, supra note 18, at
1149. The meaning of such terms are largely established before the contract is signed, and, to
the extent that further clarification of that terminology is required, those costs can be amortized
over all contracts using those standardized terms.
167. See, e.g., InterDigital Commc'ns Corp. v. Nokia Corp., 407 F. Supp. 2d 522, 529-30
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (involving a contract dispute regarding, inter alia, the meaning ofthe term "the
assets").
168. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. SI. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 249 N.Y.S.2d
208, 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981)
("When the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect
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Similarly, under the doctrine of Frustration of Purpose, courts may
sometimes excuse a party from performing contractual obligations
that have been affected by unforeseen events. 169
3. Patents and Statutes
It is tempting to analogize patents to statutes because statutes
suffer from some of the same communication weaknesses as patents.
Statutes are often designed to apply in varied factual circumstances.
Consequently, like patents, statutes frequently utilize broad, opentextured terms. Moreover, legislators may agree only regarding broad
concepts and disagree regarding specific details, so that less detailed
language may therefore be more likely to gain majority support. 170
For these (and perhaps other) reasons,171 the language in statutes is
often extremely open-textured. l72 In this respect, comparisons
between patents and statutes do not suggest that the scope of patents
should be made clearer.
Despite
these
similarities,
statutes
enJoy
important
communication advantages that patents lack. First, Congress can
afford to expend more resources drafting and critiquing statutes than
patentees can spend drafting patents. In 2006, the USPTO received
more than 417,000 new patent applications l73 and issued more than
180,000 patents. 174 In contrast, in 2006 the 109th Congress-which had
Republican majorities in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate during a Republican presidency-managed to pass only 249
to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is
reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court.").
169. In re Schenck Tours, Inc., 69 B.R. 906, 911 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987); In re M & M
Transp. Co. v. Schuster Express, Inc., 13 B.R. 861, 869 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); Farlou Realty
Corp. v. Woodsam Assocs., 49 N.Y.S.2d 367, 371 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944).
170. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (stating that one reason that Congress might have used uncertain language might have
been that "Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question"); cf Long,
supra note 18, at 506 (discussing the same phenomena with patents).
171. A full discussion of the reasons for uncertainty in the drafting oflegislation is beyond
the scope of this article.
172. Statutes often require substantial interpretation to determine their precise meaning.
HART, supra note 12, at 131-32; Mullally, supra note 9, at 363.
173. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, Peiformance and Accountability Report Fiscal
Year
2006,
USPTO
ANNUAL
REpORTS
(2006),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/corn!annuaI/2006/3020100yatentperfrm.html;
see
also
Miller, supra note 53, at 197 (reporting that the USPTO receives more than 300,000 patent
applications every year).
174. This figure was obtained by running a search on the USPTO's official website for
patents issuing in the year 2006. See http://patft.uspto.gov (click the "Advanced Search" link in
"Issued Patents" section; query using the text "isdl20060 I 0 1->20061231 ").
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bills and 1,345 measures. 175 With far fewer laws being passed
compared to patents, the legislators can divert substantially more
resources to ensuring statutory clarity, provided they have the
political will to do SO.176 In addition, interested parties can lobby the
legislature to address their concerns, including concerns about clarity
of meaning.
Second, though the scope of a term in a statute is often clarified
long after the statute is passed, there is a more robust, institutionalized
scheme for this process than in the case of patents. Words and phrases
in statutes are frequently interpreted by courts, and these
interpretations carry the force of precedent. For example, 42 V.S.C.
§ 1988 provides that a court may award "reasonable" attorney's fees
to a "prevailing party" (except a government party) in an action
brought under 42 V.S.c. § 1983 regarding the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. In
complex litigation involving multiple claims, however, it may be
unclear whether a party has "prevailed." Courts have accordingly
elaborated on the meaning of this term. 177 These cases do not merely
decide the meaning of this term in individual instances. Through stare
decisis, these decisions have created a robust rule for interpreting
"prevailing" in future cases as well. Furthermore, courts attempt to
provide further clarity by similarly construing the same terms in
different statutes. 178 For example, courts typically treat "prevailing
party" and "reasonable" fee provisions the same in § 1988 and other
statutes, including § 285 of the Patent ACt. 179 This effort to promote
175. The
Senate
publishes
reports
of
Congressional
efforts
at
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayoutireference/two_column_tablelResumes.htm.
The
Congressional resume for the 2006 session of the 109th Congress is available at
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/I 09_2. pdf.
176. At the end of 2006, the USPTO employed 4,883 patent examiners, see U.S. PATENT
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2006. Table 28:
End of Year Personnel, USPTO ANNUAL REpORTS (2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2006/50328_table28.html. whereas Congress is
composed of 100 Senators and 435 members of the House of Representatives. Although the
number of patent examiners is nearly 10 times the number of legislators, the number of patent
applications filed in 2006 is more than 250 times the number of bills and measures passed in
2006. Moreover, legislators often employ substantial networks of support staff.
177.
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't. of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 603 (2001); Highway Equip. Co. v. FECO, Ltd., 469 F.3d 1027, 1035 (Fed. Cir.
2006); Inland Steel Co. v. LTV Steel Co., 364 F.3d 1318, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
178. See Kaplow, supra note 36, at 577-79.
179. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000); Highway Equip. Co., 469 F.3d at 1035 (noting that
"prevailing party" has a similar meaning for the purposes of § 285 of the Patent Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1988, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54). Copyright law also provides for the award of "reasonable" fees to
the "prevailing party" in some cases. 17 U.S.c. § 505 (2000).
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consistency provides greater certainty regarding the meanings of
statutes and clarification costs can be amortized over many cases. 180
Administrative agencies address indeterminate portions of
statutes through administrative adjudication. 181 Agencies also create
new messages regarding the scope of legislation through
administrative rulemaking. 182 In fact, agencies are considered
particUlarly adept when interpreting and elaborating on Congress's
statutory messages. Under the Chevron l83 Doctrine, administrative
agencies are given substantial deference when construing a statute
that the agency administers. 184 When the meaning of a statute is
unclear, the agency's interpretation prevails if it is "a permissible
construction of the statute," that is, unless the construction is
"arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.,,185
In contrast, patent law provides only two types of post-issuance
administrative review of patents-reissuance and reexamination-and
neither of these administrative procedures provides meaningful
opportunities to clarify patent scope. Reissue procedures only allow a
patent owner to correct inadvertent "mistakes" that render the patent
"wholly or partly inoperative or invalid.,,186 Though such corrections
may occasionally clarify the scope of a patent, uncertainty in patent
claims is often inherent and not a mistake. Moreover, reissuance
proceedings can only be brought by the patent owner,187 and thus
cannot help potential infringers resolve uncertainty about the scope of
a patent. In reexamination proceedings, the patentee or a third party
requests that the USPTO review an issued patent regarding a
"substantial new question of patentability.,,188 In responding to the
reexamination, the patentee can amend the patent. Though the
180. H.L.A. Hart has cautioned that identically applying the same terms in different
statutes-creating a "heaven of concepts"-may prevent a statute from meeting its legislative
aims, in some cases. HART, supra note 12, at 130.
181. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 418, 424 (1999) (discussing the
Board of Immigration Appeals's interpretation ofa federal statute).
182. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984).
183. Id.
184. Id.; see also Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424 (granting Chevron "deference" to an
interpretation of a statute in administrative adjudication). This authority does not apply when
Congress has addressed the precise question at issue. Only when there is some uncertainty-as in
cases that are not plain or prototypical-will agencies enjoy deference.
185. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
186. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000); see also 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000).
187. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.176 (2000) (noting that reissue proceedings will proceed "in the
same manner as a non-reissue, non-provisional application").
188. 35 U.S.c. § 303 (2000).
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amendment might be clearer than the original patent, particularly
because it can be contrasted with the unamended patent, such
"clarifying" amendments are merely coincident to the patentability
challenge and may not occur. More importantly, an amendment
changes the patent scope instead of clarifying the scope of the
original patent.
The vast majority of clarification of patent scope occurs ex post
through judicial interpretation of patents. 189 Such adjudication is,
however, different from the judicial interpretation of statutes in at
least two respects. First, interpretation of claim terms is expensive
compared to statutory interpretation. Many statutes are central to
multiple lawsuits, and the cost to the courts (and other repeat players)
of interpreting statutory language can be amortized over multiple
applications of that statute. In contrast, relatively few patents are
addressed in multiple lawsuits. 190 Consequently, there is less
opportunity to amortize the cost of judicial interpretation. Second,
judicial interpretation of statutes is viewed as part of the system, not
as a reason, sufficient by itself, to impose radical changes on the
process of creating statutes. In contrast, critics of patent law argue
that patent claims need to be clearer in order to avoid the need for
post-issuance interpretation through litigation. 191

C. Inefficiency of Relying Solely on Ex Ante Clarification
For any given set of interpretive rules, the creation of clearer,
more detailed messages requires additional investment by the party
creating and sending those messages. As a result, drafting more
explicit patents and patent claims requires additional investment by
patentees and may require additional work on the part of patent
examiners as well. These additional costs will not be efficient unless
they are outweighed by the benefits they produce. However, it

189. In 2007, approximately 770 reexamination proceedings and 994 reissue proceedings
were initiated. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REpORT:
FISCAL
YEAR
2007
110,
121
(2008),
available
at
http://www. uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2007/2007annualreport.pdf. In contrast, more
than 2,500 patent suits are initiated each year. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 122. More
importantly, reexamination and reissue proceedings focus on validity and therefore provide little
opportunity for clarification of patent scope. See supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text.
190. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer, 1.,
dissenting).
191. See, e.g., Mullally, supra note 9, at 380 (arguing that the cost of increased disclosure
in patents may be "offset in the avoidance of greater costs to the public and the avoidance of
litigation" (footnote omitted)); Kieff, supra note 14, at 110 (arguing that the cost to patentees of
improved drafting "are substantially less than those associated with litigating").
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appears that there will be no benefit in most instances because so few
patents ever yield any value to the patentees. Mark Lemley estimates
that only 5% of patents ultimately provide any revenue to owners.192
Given this percentage, ex ante efforts would be inefficient unless the
average benefit added to patents through these efforts was, by one
estimation, at least twenty times their average COSt. 193 Though other
estimates are more conservative, they are consistent with the lack of
substantial economic value of most patents. James Bessen and
Michael J. Meurer report that more than half of all patents expire
prematurely because their owners are unwilling to pay renewal fees.
"This suggests that the majority of patents are not worth more than a
few thousand dollars.,,194 Because ex ante measures for improved
communication of patent scope must produce a high return on
investment, such proposals should not be implemented absent
compelling support demonstrating a high ratio of average benefits to
average costs. 195
Another reason it is often inefficient to invest additional
resources improving the quality of the messages sent regarding patent
scope is that patent communications provide relatively little
opportunity for the amortization of such costs. Patents communicate
to a relatively small audience because they are intended to be read and
interpreted only by practitioners in a certain technical field. 196
192. Lemley, supra note 162, at 1507; see also Thomas, supra note 58, at 166 (discussing
Lemley's conclusions); Miller, supra note 53, (discussing Lemley's conclusions). Lemley
acknowledges that the figure he reports of 5% does not include patents that are cross-licensed.
These patents, however, are largely irrelevant to a discussion of improving communications
regarding patent scope. "Large companies tend to come to the table with hundreds of patents on
each side, relying on volume rather than quality in some sort of 'patent arms race.'" Lemley,
supra note 162, at 1504. Similarly, some patents may be valuable, but never the subject of
licensing discussions or disputes. Such patents, however, likely do not exhibit problems with
communicating patent scope because those patents are not the subject of a disagreement
regarding scope.
193. In theory, improved communication could render valuable some 95% of the patents
that previously did not yield any revenue. Even if the improved communication doubled the
number of patents producing any value (a very unlikely result), however, the benefits of the
proposal still must be ten times greater than its per-patent cost to justify the proposal. Moreover,
raising the cost of obtaining a patent might encourage some inventors not to seek patent
protection at all, thereby potentially reducing the number of patents with some value.
194. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 100; see also id. at 104 ("Each patent is like a
lottery ticket.").
195. Miller, supra note 53, at 196 (noting that "it would of course be foolish to mandate
new disclosure rules so exacting that the increased cost of patent preparation swamps any
predictability benefit that the changes would produce.").
196. Long, supra note 18, at 487-88, 523. This specialized audience may provide for some
communication advantages compared to other forms of property because specialized audiences
may be able to interpret messages more easily. Henry Smith has argued that efficiency generally
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Moreover, amortization effects are also reduced by the fact that
patents are limited by both de jure and de facto time restrictions.
Patents last less than twenty years,197 but a patent related to rapidly
changing technology may become obsolete in less time.
Despite these reasons to doubt the efficiency of improving the
quality of the messages sent regarding patent scope, commentators
have focused on changes to patent law that are designed to encourage
all patentees to provide more information ex ante regarding patent
scope. 198 For example, some have suggested requiring a glossary
regarding terms in the patent. 199 Others have suggested new rules of
interpretation, such as construing all uncertainties in a patent against
the patentee as the drafter. 200 Such an "information-forcing penalty
default" would, it is hoped, encourage the patentee to disclose
information resolving those ambiguities. Such proposals to improve
ex ante communication are unlikely to improve patent certainty
efficiently. As an initial matter, these proposals mistakenly assume
that the patentee possesses the information needed to prevent
uncertainty?OI As noted above, some of the sources of patent-scope

requires that the size of an audience for a given message is inversely proportional to the amount
of information contained in the message. "For the same cost, one can communicate a lot to a
small, close-knit audience or a little to a large, anonymous audience." Smith, supra note 18, at
1125. Smith's thesis indicates that, with a small specialized audience, the marginal benefits from
a modest investment in increased certainty may be large. Given the relatively small audience
size for patents, a substantial amount of detailed information is, in fact, communicated,
particularly in the "plain cases" noted above. See id. at 1173-76 (discussing the audiences for
patents); supra note 162 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, because many patents do not
generate any revenue, the expected benefit from increased ex ante investment in communication
must be substantially discounted so that, even if a modest investment can substantially increase
certainty, that expenditure may not exceed the expected benefit.
197. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
198. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 239; Mullally, supra note 9, at 380; Thomas,
supra note 58, at 164 (noting that "many commentators believe it is only fair that inventors
should claim their inventions precisely.").
199. Miller, supra note 53, at 203-05; see also Mullally, supra note 9, at 377-78
(discussing the voluntary use ofa glossary).
200. Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 54; Miller, supra note 53, at 186.
20 I. Mullally, supra note 9, at 379; Bender, supra note 13, at 220; Thomas, supra note 58,
at 167; see, e.g., Miller, supra note 53, at 206 (proposing that patentees "provide an exclusive,
exhaustive list of express definitions for any claim term to which the applicant gives a meaning
other than it [sic] ordinary meaning"); Kieff, supra note 14, at 110-\2 (advocating that patentees
"simply draft[] a better patent disclosure at the outset"); Bender, supra note 13, at 220
(proposing that patentees identify when they act as their own lexicographers); see also Long,
supra note 18, at 538 ("When the information costs of comprehending intangible goods are
high, legal rules can compensate in other ways, such as by shifting information costs from
observers onto owners, by forcing owners to disgorge information about the goods, or by
lowering the sanction against observers for violating their legal duties.").
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uncertainty are inherent. 202 Moreover, these proposals fail to establish
that the cost of reducing any uncertainties is less than the benefits of
the proposals, given the need to incur costs for the majority of patents
where claim scope certainty will never matter. 203
IV. IMPROVING COMMUNICATION AND DEFINITION OF PATENT
SCOPE

A. The Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Scope
Increasing the clarity of patent scope ex ante may prevent the
sometimes substantial costs caused by uncertainty,204 but additional
resources should not be devoted to increased ex ante clarification
unless the marginal costs exceed the resulting marginal gains. As
indicated above, communication difficulties regarding patent scope
limit the marginal benefits of enhanced ex ante delineation. For
example, some sources of uncertainty regarding patent scope are
difficult, if not impossible, to address ex ante. Words in patent claims,
particularly broad terms, are inherently imprecise. Likewise,
infringement scenarios that cannot be reasonably foreseen cannot be
considered and addressed ex ante. Furthermore, even when enhanced
ex ante delineation is possible, it may not be cost-effective because so
few patents yield meaningful revenue. 20S Requiring patent applicants
to include additional information might produce benefits for a small
group of patents, but would raise costs for every application.
Efficiency is more likely to be achieved by deferring some
efforts to determine more precisely the scope of a patent until after a
patent is asserted-that is, ex post. Clarification at that time does not
suffer from the efficiency-limiting constraints noted above. Although
the words in a patent may still be inherently imprecise, the scope of
the patent need only be partially clarified-enough to address the
alleged infringement. Similarly, ex post clarification need not address
all potential infringement scenarios. Instead, it is only necessary to

202.
203.

See supra Parts III.A.I to IlI.A.3.
But see Miller, supra note 53, at 196-99 (arguing that certain enhancements to patent

disclosure are cost effective). Reforms premised on using the preexisting patent disclosure
requirements more effectively to promote clarity-particularly in the "plain cases" for which
terms are clear-<lo not suffer from this deficiency. But cf Lemley, supra note 162, at 1523
(noting that an argument against expanding the procedures for reviewing patent applications is
consistent with proposals to improve the quality of the review without such expansions).
204. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
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address the alleged infringement at issue?06 Moreover, ex post
clarification is likely to be required in the case of patents with
sufficient potential value to justify a dispute. Though this ex post
approach involves costs caused by ex ante errors in market behavior
resulting from mistakes about the scope of patents and by the need to
interpret the words in patent claims and to clarify the indeterminate
aspects, it is likely to be more efficient than requiring all patentees to
provide enhanced ex ante messages regarding the scope of all
patents. 207
Though some critics have argued that patents should have clear
ex ante boundaries like real property,208 an important body of
scholarship concerning traditional property supports the advantage of
ex post clarification of patent rights. For example, Terry Anderson
and P.J. Hill argue in their well-known study of real property in the
American West that, when the scope of an asset is uncertain and the
resolution of that uncertainty through boundary definition activity
could increase its value, efficiency may favor improving boundary
definition for the asset. 209 The increase in value (marginal gain)
efficiently justifies an increase in boundary definition (marginal cost).
For example, Anderson and Hill contend that rising land values and
the reduced cost of boundary communication made possible by the
introduction of barbed wire led to the fencing of the American range.
These changes led to an "increase of the productivity [in property]
definition and enforcement activity" in the form of fences? 10
Though Anderson and Hill focus on the marginal costs and
benefits of establishing and enforcing boundaries in order to create
new private property rights, such as the privatization of public
property like land in the Great Plains, the same efficiency concerns

206. In fact, in typical patent litigation, the meaning of some claim terms is not contested.
Disputes focus on less than all of the claim terms.
207. James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer argue that patent reform is necessary because
the costs of patent litigation-the mainstay of ex post clarification of patent scope--<:urrently
exceed the benefits of patents. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 218,222-23. In short, they
argue that the entire patent system is inefficient. Even if these commentators are correct, for the
reasons noted herein, some ex post clarification of patent scope is important in a patent system
that is operating efficiently.
208. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 46-72.
209. Terry L. Anderson & P.l. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the
American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 167 (1975); see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347, 349 (1967); see also Smith, supra note 18, at 1149-50
(discussing Demsetz).
210. Anderson & Hill, supra note 209, at 167.
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apply to private property rights that already exist. 2l1 For example, if
valuable mineral deposits are discovered on a parcel of land, the
owner, or her neighbors, may rationally pay for a careful survey of the
boundaries to determine exactly how much of the mineral deposit she
can extract without trespassing on neighboring land. In determining
whether to invest in enhanced boundary definition, it is crucial to
identify circumstances where such investment will efficiently increase
the value of the property right. That one parcel of land is more
valuable if carefully surveyed does not justify an expensive survey for
all parcels of land.
When a patent becomes the subject of an infringement dispute,
increased investment in scope clarification is more likely to produce
substantial benefits because the patent is likely one of the few patents
that is valuable and because that value likely depends, at least in part,
upon the resolution of uncertainties regarding the patent's scope. 212
For that group of patents, the litigation exposes "[a]n increase in the
probability of loss" of value claimed by the patent owner,213 which
"will usually result in an increase in the productivity of property
rights [definition] activities.,,214 Thus, it is more efficient to focus
resources on resolving uncertainty at this ex post time than to do so ex
ante.
Louis Kaplow's well-known analysis of rules and standards
further indicates that patent clarification ex post sometimes is more
efficient than enhanced communication ex ante. Kaplow contrasts
"rules," which provide details ex ante regarding legally proscribed
conduct, with "standards," which provide general guidelines that are
clarified ex post, such as through litigation.215 Kaplow argues that,
when there is little chance that a law will apply to a particular factual
scenario, efficiency is promoted by utilizing a standards-based waitand-see approach rather than investing resources ex ante to craft a
detailed rule governing that scenario?16 "For example, the law of
negligence applies to a wide array of complex accident scenarios,
211. Jd.
212. Lichtman, supra note 13, at 179 ("Patents that are drawn into litigation, however, are
a special subset. They have economic consequence-why else would the parties find it
worthwhile to invest in litigation?"). But cf Anderson & Hill, supra note 209, at 178 (,The
higher the value of an asset and the higher the probability of losing the right to use that asset, the
greater the degree of definition and enforcement activity.").
213. Anderson & Hill, supra note 209, at 167.
214. Jd.
215. Kaplow, supra note 36, at 560.
216. Jd. at 577; see also id. at 579 ('The value of effort in designing a rule depends upon
the frequency of behavior subject to the rule .... ").
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many of which are materially different from each other and, when
considered in isolation, are unlikely to OCCUr.,,217 Patents impose a
legal duty not to engage in infringing activities. However, because
most patents do not generate revenue, they are never applied to
infringement scenarios. As a result, treating the uncertain margins of
patent claims as standards to be clarified ex post is likely to be more
efficient than requiring that patent claims be drafted as fully-specified
rules?18
Increased reliance on ex post clarification of patent scope, as
opposed to increasing ex ante clarification, will cause patent scope to
be more uncertain for some period of time, and this additional
uncertainty will entail costs. For example, the uncertainty may chill
socially beneficial activity that falls within the uncertain portions of
the patent's scope, even if it is later determined that the activity did
not, in fact, infringe the patent. 219 In addition, there may be litigation
costs incurred under an ex post system that would not occur as a
result of the increased certainty available under a more robust ex ante
scheme. Nevertheless, because of the inherent limits of specifying
patent scope ex ante and the inefficiency of investing in the majority
of patents having little or no value, ex post clarification provides
substantial benefits. To promote "the Progress of Science and useful
Arts" efficiently, the relative costs and benefits of both ex ante
specification of patent scope and ex post clarification must be
balanced. 220
B. Mechanisms for Ex Post Clarification of Patent Scope
The remainder of this section discusses the current approach to
ex post clarification of patent scope and some proposals for
improving it. 221 Two fora are generally available for ex post

217. ld. at 564.
218. See id. at 573 ("Even if they are extremely costly to apply, the significant likelihood
that the particular application will never arise may make standards much cheaper.").
219. For a more lengthy discussion of the costs of uncertain patents, see supra notes 63-66
and accompanying text.
220. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Cotropia, supra note 9, at 95.
221. The proposal to rely on ex post clarification of patent scope has some similarities with
the "soft look" registration approach described and analyzed by F. Scott Kieff. Under such an
approach, patent applications are registered, not examined, so that all validity determinations
occur ex post. Kieff, supra note 14, at 72. Kieffargues that such a registration system would be
efficient in part because "the costs of providing the information needed to decide validity and
the costs of 'correct' adjudication with the information are likely to be lower if these
determinations are made in litigation than if they are made in patent examination." ld. at 73.
Only patents that ultimately become the subject of a dispute would be tested for validity. ld. at
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clarification: judicial litigation and administrative proceedings before
the USPTO. 222
1. Revisions to patent law applied in courts
Today, uncertainty regarding patent scope is clarified almost
entirely through ex post judicial review in the form of claim
construction. Although courts should more explicitly acknowledge
that the scope of patent claims are largely indeterminate ex ante,
many patent law doctrines already tacitly recognize that patent scope
cannot be known ex ante. For example, patent infringement is a strict
liability offense in that an infringer's ignorance of the scope of a
patent is not a defense to infringement. 223 Similarly, courts have held
that patent examiners must determine whether to grant a patent
application based on the broadest reasonable construction of the
claims, not on the examiner's own understanding. 224 This requirement
recognizes that, if a patent application is granted, the examiner's own
interpretation of the claims may differ from a later judicial
construction. In particular, a patent examiner's own understanding of
the scope of the claims might be narrower than a later judicial claim
construction. In that case, the patent examiner might never have
granted the patent application had the examiner considered the
application using the broader interpretation. 225 Courts avoid that
72. Contrary to the thesis of this article, however, Kieff states that the patent applicant must "put
the public on clear notice of what will infringe and what will not" and that "the patentee, as
drafter, is the least cost avoider of such ambiguities." Id. at 99.
222. Other fora might be available, such as arbitration.
223. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 35 U.S.C. § 284
(2000). Uncertainty regarding the scope of patent protection suggests that patent infringement
should perhaps not be a strict liability offense, If an infringer could not have obtained the
information necessary to avoid infringement, should the infringer nevertheless be liable? This
issue requires further research and is beyond the scope of this article, in part because an
infringer may be unable to know about a patent ex ante for reasons unrelated to the clarity of its
scope, such as when infringement begins when a patent is still in the application stage, BESSEN
& MEURER, supra note 8, at 10,
224, Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., LP" 323 F.3d 989, 995 (Fed, Cir.
2003),
225, That the patent examiner would have granted the patent using the court's construction
is important because issued patents are by statute presumed to be valid, 35 U.S.c. § 282 (2000),
Courts have further strengthened this presumption by requiring that invalidity be proven by clear
and convincing evidence, Zenith Elec. Corp, v, POI Commc'n Sys" Inc" 522 F.3d 1348, 1363
(Fed, Cir. 2008). This presumption is based at least in part on:
the deference that is due to a qualified government agency presumed to have
properly done its job, which includes one or more examiners who are assumed to
have some expertise in interpreting the references and to be familiar from their
work with the level of skill in the art and whose duty it is to issue only valid
patents.
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problem by reqUITIng examiners to assess patentability using the
broadest reasonable construction, so that a later judicial claim
construction is likely to be no broader than the construction used to
issue the patent. Because narrower claims are more likely to satisfy
patentability requirements, the patent examiner likely would have
granted the patent application even if it used the court's later
construction. 226
Certain patent law doctrines, however, improperly assume that
patents provide ex ante notice of the scope of patent rights. For
instance, a court may increase damages for "willful" infringement,227
and courts sometimes hold that mere knowledge of a patent renders
infringement willful. 228 Merely reading a patent may be held to
provide sufficient notice of the scope of a patent to render
infringement willful, thereby entitling the patentee to enhanced
damages.229 Courts should recognize, however, that the patent, by
itself, provides notice of scope only with familiar prototypes and
should limit findings of willful infringement accordingly.23o

McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262, F.3d 1339, \353 (Fed. Cir. 200 I); accord Lemley, supra
note 162, at 1527-28. The competence of patent examiners only justifies the presumption of
validity; however, if a patent examiner would not have granted the patent application had the
examiner used the claim construction later found by a court.
226. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that this approach
"serves the public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given
broader scope than is justified.").
227. Thomas, supra note 58, at 164-65; see also Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311,
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that a finding of willful infringement may support an award of
enhanced damages).
228. Thomas, supra note 58, at 164-65.
229. Id On the other hand, courts reviewing a claim of willful infringement sometimes
recognize that patents may not ex ante fully delineate the scope of provided rights. A good-faith
defense to infringement based on a reasonable claim construction-even if that claim
construction is ultimately rejected by the court-may prevent a patent owner from obtaining
enhanced damages. Similarly, courts may not award enhanced damages for infringement under
the Doctrine of Equivalents. "[I]t is not a rule of law that infringement that is not literal can
never be sufficiently culpable to warrant enhanced damages ... [but] avoidance of literal
infringement is a fact to be considered and weighed, along with other relevant facts .... "
Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. 8P Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Difficulties
in determining patent scope ex ante may also justifY limiting the remedy for patent infringement
to a reasonable royalty instead of awarding injunctive relief. e8ay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.c., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (requiring courts to consider equitable considerations before
awarding injunctive relief for patent infringement); see also Smith, supra note 18, at 1166
(noting the importance oflimiting the liability of audience members in some communications).
230. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text; see also 8urk & Lemley, supra note
74, at 55 (arguing that certain patent law doctrines should be adjusted in light of inherent
indeterminacy in the meanings of patent claims).
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Courts should also acknowledge that, in light of indetenninacies
of fact and aim, a patent might not communicate the full extent of
patent scope to the patentee. For example, patent law requires that a
patentee include sufficient infonnation in the patent specification "to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same .... ,,231 This
enablement requirement applies to every patent claim individually,
mandating that the specification enable each claim so that a skilled
artisan could practice the invention without the need for "undue
experimentation.,,232 Significantly, if a claim is not enabled to its full
scope, it is invalid. 233 A patentee, however, may enable a claim to the
full extent of one possible interpretation of a patent claim, but not a
broader interpretation that is later adopted by a court. 234 If the
patentee reasonably and in good faith considered the patent narrower
than ultimately construed by the court, the court should invalidate the
patent claim only to the extent that it is broader than the patentee's
construction.
2. A New Administrative Proceeding before the USPTO
to Clarify Patent Scope

Much of the uncertainty regarding patent scope cannot be
efficiently addressed ex ante, and ex post clarification generally
occurs in the context of expensive patent litigation in the courtS.235
Therefore, to reduce the cost of ex post delineation, a new
administrative procedure should be established in which the USPTO
can more cheaply clarify patent claims?36 Such a new procedure is
necessary because the two existing ex post administrative
proceedings, reexamination and reissuance proceedings/ 37 do not
provide opportunities for clarifying patent scope. Reexamination
proceedings, which allow the USPTO to reconsider the validity of a
patent in light of the state of the art prior to the alleged invention,238
typically involve some prior art reference that was not considered

231. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
232. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
233. Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352, 1360-62 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
234. See, e.g., id. (finding a patent invalid for failing to satisfy the enablement requirement
where the patent owner advocated for a narrower and fully enabled claim construction).
235. See supra notes 186-187 and accompanying text.
236. Cf BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 241-42 (proposing that the USPTO provide
an "opinion letter" regarding patent infringement).
237. See supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text.
238. 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
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before the patent issued.239 Given their focus on validity in light of a
prior art reference, reexaminations provide no meaningful opportunity
for simply clarifying a patent's scope. Similarly, reissue proceedings
only allow for the correction of patents that are "wholly or partially
inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective specification or
drawing or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he
had a right to claim in the patent.,,240 Reissue proceedings are thus
limited to correcting mistakes and would not support clarification of
patent scope that, through no mistake, was inchoate and uncertain.
Reissue proceedings, however, could be expanded to include
"clarifying reissue proceedings" that would allow for clarification
regarding the meaning of words and phrases in patent claims. 241 Such
proceedings would involve the review and reissue of patents with
additional information that more clearly describes the scope of patent
protection. Third-parties should be given meaningful adversarial
rights because their involvement could help identify where and how
the patent needs clarification and because such a meaningful role
ensures the fairness of binding them to the clarification in later
litigation concerning the patent, if any arises. 242 The patent examiner
would be able to ensure that reissued claims clearly address the
factual scenarios raised by third parties and patentees, thereby
addressing indeterminacies of fact and aim in the patents scope. 243
Most importantly, clarifying reissue proceedings would be
cheaper than judicial claim construction in two respects. First, the
USPTO has technical expertise that may facilitate efficient
clarification. 244 For example, examiners can use that expertise to
identify and understand which details of patent scope have already
been delineated ex ante, which details therefore need further ex post
clarification, and any relationships between the specified and
unspecified details. Second, clarifying reissue proceedings would
239. See 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
240. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
24l. Administrative proceedings for clarifying patent scope could also be developed
separately from current reissue proceedings, but leveraging existing administrative procedures
might facilitate the creation of new procedures. Apart from the details sketched below, a
complete discussion of the procedures for conducting clarifying reissue proceedings is beyond
the scope of this article.
242. See infra note 246 and accompanying text. Reexamination proceedings currently
allow for third party involvement. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-18 (2000).
243. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 50 (noting that "[Ilawyers propose
interpretations of claims with an eye toward the outcome they will produce").
244. See PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Paltex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594,602 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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focus only on claim construction and therefore would be cheaper than
ex post clarification through litigation?45 Judicial claim construction
typically involves numerous other sources of expense, including
discovery regarding all issues in a patent infringement case, even
issues that are not directly related to claim construction, such as
validity, equitable considerations relating to the enforceability of the
patent, the details of an accused product or method, and
counterclaims. 246 Because many patent suits settle after claim
construction, clarifying reissue proceedings should prevent many
patent infringement suits from ever being filed. In addition, even if a
clarified reissue patent is later the subject of patent litigation, the cost
of adding those clarifications would not be incurred a second time
during the litigation. When a patent is reissued, the original,
unclarified patent is "surrender[ ed],,,247 and only the clarified reissued
patent claims could be asserted in subsequent litigation?48
Some aspects of reissue proceedings are already well-suited to
reducing patent-scope uncertainty. For example, patentees are
prevented in current reissue proceedings from "recapturing" material
disclaimed during prosecution249 and from introducing new subject
matter into the patent. 250 Clarifying reissue proceedings would
likewise prohibit the patentee from changing the scope of the patent
through recapture or expansion by way of adding new subject matter.
Clarifying reissue proceedings would only provide an opportunity for
refining uncertain scope, not changing that scope altogether.
245. Similarly, reexamination proceedings are designed to "settle validity disputes more
quickly and less expensively than the often protracted litigation involved in such cases." Paltex
Corp., 758 F.2d at 602; see also Alan Devlin, Revisiting the Presumption of Patent Validity, 37
Sw. U. L. REv. 323, 360 (2008) (stating that reexamination proceedings address validity more
cheaply and efficiently than litigation).
246. See, e.g., Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(deciding an appeal in a patent infringement case of issues related to claim construction,
infringement, validity, inequitable conduct, and antitrust counterclaims). Some of these
discovery costs might be avoided if judicial proceedings were bifurcated to allow for early
resolution of claim construction issues.
247. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000).
248. ClarifYing reissue proceedings would not bar litigants from later disputing the scope
of the patent claims as clarified. Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 50. In a later claim
construction dispute, however, a court would not repeat the administrative clarification. For
example, a litigant would not be able to assert a claim construction that directly conflicted with
the administrative clarifications. As with normal reissue proceedings, the court would accept as
a starting point the clarified claims as if they were the claims that originally issued in the patent.
See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000) (noting that reissue patents have the same "effect and operation of
law ... as if the same had been originally granted in such amended form).
249. See Mentor Corp. v. Coloplast, Inc., 998 F.2d 992, 995 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
250. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
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The effect of clarifying reissue proceedings should differ from
normal reissue proceedings in at least one important respect; normal
reissue proceedings can give rise to "intervening rights," but
clarifying reissue proceedings should not. Normal reissue proceedings
may broaden patent rights beyond the scope of the original patent. 251
However, because "the public has a right to use what is not
specifically claimed in the original patents,,,252 third parties cannot be
liable for activities that occurred before reissuance and infringe the
reissued patent but not the original patent. 253 The public has such
"intervening rights" during the time period from the date the original
patent issued and the date the patent was reissued. Similar to
broadening reissue proceedings, some clarifying reissue proceedings
might reject a narrower clarification in favor of a broader one. Such a
selection should not create "intervening rights," however, because
clarifying reissue would only make patent scope clearer, not change
it. 254 Because patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the
inability of a third party to know the detailed scope of the patent
before clarifying reissuance should not create any temporary
exemption from liability for damages.255
V. CONCLUSION
To serve the constitutional goal of patent law, "promot[ing] the
Progress of Science and useful Arts,,,256 patent scope should be
tailored to the patentee's inventive contribution, and should not
restrain others from undertaking activities that are different from the
patentee's invention. Frequently, however, inherent limitations
undermine the capacity of words to capture and accurately convey the
scope of the invention. Patent claims communicate for generallyaccepted prototypical examples whether a factual scenario falls within

251. Current reissue proceedings allow a patentee to "enlarge[e1the scope of the claims,"
provided that the proceedings commence within two years of the patent issuing. 35 U.S.C. § 251
(2000).
252. Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 756 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
253. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000). Courts may also grant third parties limited rights extending
beyond reissuance on the basis of equity.
254. Clarifying reissue proceedings would merely elucidate and not change the scope of
the patent. For this reason, the two-year limitation on broadening reissue would also not apply to
clarifying reissue. Indeed, such a temporal limitation would be problematic since disputes
regarding patent scope may not arise until more than two years after issuance.
255. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007). See supra note
223 and accompanying text.
256. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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the protected contours of a patent. 257 Beyond the limited confines of
agreed prototypes, the meanings of the tenns in patent claims can, and
to some degree must, be unclear. In addition, in order to capture the
full scope of the invention, patent scope typically must be broadened
beyond the original embodiment underlying the discovery. Even if
this broadening is explicit, broad tenninology exacerbates
uncertainty. Unifonnly requiring increased investment in ex ante
delineation is wasteful because the vast majority of patents yield no
revenue. 258 Thus, because of the inherent limitations of language and
difficulties in foreseeing and describing all of the factual scenarios
that might infringe a patent, clarifying ex post whether a patent's
scope encompasses one particular factual scenario is likely to be more
efficient than increased ex ante efforts. 259
Many courts and commentators, however, present the
uncertainty in claim construction as a breakdown in claim drafting or
patent law, contending that claim construction should merely
elucidate boundaries that were fully established ex ante. Certainly,
some of the uncertainty in the scope of patent rights might be
addressed through more explicit claim drafting or a more detailed
specification. 26o Nevertheless, claim construction is at times the
necessary last step in defining the scope of patents, not merely a
mechanism for resolving disputes regarding rights of pre-detennined
scope. 261 Ex ante and ex post delineation therefore must be balanced

257. Solan, supra note 72, at 262 ("Our ability to apply ... rules [of interpretation] so
easily is what gives us some semblance of a rule of law. "). See also id. at 264.
258. Some proposals for clarifying ex ante patent scope do not apply uniformly to all
patents, and thus may not suffer from some of the efficiency concerns noted above. For
example, some commentators have suggested that software patents should be granted sparingly
because their boundaries are too difficult to delineate ex ante. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8,
at 152, 243-44, 260. The USPTO has begun a pilot program that allows third parties to submit
prior art relevant to certain pending patent applications. See Peer-Reviewed Prior Art Pilot,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/peerpriorartpilot/ (last visited Nov. II, 2008). That prior art
may help the examiner clarify the scope of an issued patent. These proposals, however, have
limited impact on the need for ex post clarification because, by virtue of their limited
application, these proposals do not impact a large number of patents.
259. HART, supra note 12, at 127 (noting that "something in the nature of a choice
between open alternatives must be made by whoever is to resolve them" in order to address
uncertainty regarding the scope of open-textured phrases).
260. See Mullally, supra note 9, at 370.
261. See Lemley, supra note 162, at 1522 ("On this view, the fact that accused infringers
have to pay some of the cost of determining validity is not a bug in the system, but a feature.").
Indeed, the need for additional decisions regarding patent scope-the exercise of a discretionary
choice between numerous options-may help to explain why the Federal Circuit alters district
court claim constructions in more than a third of all patent appeals. The Federal Circuit's
choices may simply differ from those of district courts.
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to promote efficiency. Courts should recognize the importance of ex
post delineation of claims by adjusting certain patent law doctrines
that are grounded on the incorrect assumption that patents
communicate with virtual certainty patent scope ex ante. 262 Moreover,
because the need for ex post delineation cannot be eliminated, it
would be more efficient to adopt a new, relatively inexpensive
administrative procedure to clarify claim scope without incurring the
costs of full-blown patent litigation.

262. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 74, at 55 (discussing revisions to patent law doctrines
based on the notice of patent scope provided ex ante by patents).
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